政府奖惩下供应链复原能力提升机制的演化博弈分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0280

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (12): 9-16.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0280

政府奖惩下供应链复原能力提升机制的演化博弈分析

王海军, 谭洁, 姬笑微

华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉 430074

收稿日期:2016-12-11 出版日期:2017-12-25
作者简介:王海军(1970-),男,江苏如东人,教授,博士,研究方向为生产运作管理、物流与供应链管理;谭洁(1990-),通讯作者,男,湖北荆州人,博士研究生,研究方向为物流与供应链风险管理;姬笑微(1988-),男,陕西延安人,硕士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71372135,71472069);国家自然科学基金国际(地区)合作与交流项目(71620107002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2017WKYXZD005)

Analysis for Enhancing Supply Chain Resilience with Government Reward and Punishment Based on Evolutionary Game

WANG Hai-jun, TAN Jie, JI Xiao-wei

School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2016-12-11 Online:2017-12-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 正常运营是农业供应链及绿色供应链等相当一部分供应链展开深入工作的前提,政府奖惩是保证供应链正常运营的重要措施。运用演化博弈论研究供应链成员企业进行复原能力投入时的决策行为:随着投入贡献增大,供应商和买方的演化过程出现五种演化稳定策略。同时,提出政府补贴和惩罚机制,对成员企业的行为进行协调,得出促使供应链成员企业全员投入的充要条件,从而提升供应链复原能力。最后,利用数值仿真,证明演化模型的合理性及协调机制的有效性。

关键词: 供应链中断, 供应链复原能力, 演化博弈, 政府奖惩

Abstract: Normal operation is the premise of supply chain, especially for agricultural supply chain and green supply chain. Government reward and punishment is one of the important measures to ensure the normal operation of supply chain. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to study the investment decisions of supply chain members. With the increasing contribution of the investment, five evolutionary stable strategies appear. We also propose that the government should use reward and punishment mechanisms to coordinate the investment behaviors. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions to encourage all the supply chain members invest for supply chain resilience are obtained. Finally, we prove both the effectiveness of the evolution model and the rationality of the coordination mechanisms, by using numerical simulation.

Key words: supply chain disruption, supply chain resilience, evolutionary game, government reward and punishment

中图分类号:

F272.3

王海军, 谭洁, 姬笑微. 政府奖惩下供应链复原能力提升机制的演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(12): 9-16.

WANG Hai-jun, TAN Jie, JI Xiao-wei. Analysis for Enhancing Supply Chain Resilience with Government Reward and Punishment Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(12): 9-16.

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政府奖惩下供应链复原能力提升机制的演化博弈分析

Analysis for Enhancing Supply Chain Resilience with Government Reward and Punishment Based on Evolutionary Game

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