关键词: 市值管理, 定向增发, 认购方式, 利益输送, 股权集中度

Abstract: The market value of listed companies is influenced by both the intrinsic value and the external premium, so the interest motive and profit mode of large shareholders participating in the private placement need to be rediscovered in the context of market capitalization management. Focusing on the governance effect of market capitalization management, taking the influence of market capitalization management on the willingness of large shareholders participating in private placement as the starting point, with the help of internal capital allocation efficiency, this paper discusses the existence of tunneling in the two subscription modes and the effectiveness of market capitalization management. The results show that it is a positive correlation between the market capitalization management and the ratio of the subscription for new shares in the private placement with large shareholders. However, due to the existence of a more serious capital occupation, a higher degree of cash dividends and the use of asset pricing profit tendency after participating in the private placement for large shareholders, results in lower marginal capital allocation efficiency. Further studies show that market capitalization management can restrict the above tunneling behavior, its governance effect increases with the increase of ownership concentration and the institutional efficiency of private enterprise market capitalization management is more significant than that of state-owned enterprise. The conclusion provides a the oretical basis for corporate refinancing decisions and policy formulation by revealing the effectiveness of market capitalization management.

Key words: market capitalization management, private placement, tunneling, subscription form, equity concentration