关键词: 融资平台, 市场化转型, 演化博弈, 系统仿真

Abstract: In recent years, the large-scale borrowing of local financing platforms and the hidden debt risks of local governments have become more and more prominent, and the transformation of financing platforms has become an important topic in China’s current social system reform. In previous studies, the theoretical research on financing platform transformation mainly focuses on qualitative analysis and empirical research, while there are few studies on quantifying relevant measures and establishing game models to analyze the dynamic decision-making relationship among relevant subjects, and even less evolutionary game studies on financing platform transformation. Moreover, most of them are pairwise games among local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions, and rarely put these three parties in a game framework for systematic research. Therefore, it is necessary to systematically study the interactive decision-making mechanism and strategy evolution path of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions in the process of financing platform transformation under the framework of tripartite evolutionary game, which is of great theoretical and practical significance for understanding the financing platform transformation mechanism, optimizing government policy design, and promoting risk control and sustainable development.
This paper mainly studies the following questions: (1)Does Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) exist in the three-dimensional dynamical system composed of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions? Is it possible that “ideal equilibrium is the system ESS”? What conditions are needed? (2)What impact does the initial strategy have on the strategy choice of all parties and the system ESS? (3)Will random disturbance factors change the system ESS, and what influence does it have on the attraction domain of ESS? In order to answer the above research questions, a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions is constructed based on the replication dynamic equation. In terms of model analysis, according to Friedman’s research method and Lyapunov’s first method, the evolutionary stability of game systems is emphatically discussed, and a sufficient condition that “ideal equilibrium is the system ESS” is given. In terms of simulation research, a set of examples are designed according to the actual situation, and the influence of the initial strategy on the strategy selection of all parties and the system ESS is simulated by Matlab R2017b software. By introducing random disturbance factors, the influence of random disturbance factors on the system ESS and its attraction domain is discussed with simulation.
This paper mainly draws the following conclusions: (1)No matter whether local governments guide platform transformation or not, traditional financing platforms can’t get loan support from financial institutions for a long time, and transformation is an inevitable choice for financing platforms. Moreover, the first prerequisite for the successful transformation of financing platforms is to obtain financial support from local governments, and the policy guidance and regulatory restriction of local governments during the transition period are indispensable. (2)The more positive the attitude of local governments and financial institutions towards platform transformation, the more likely and accelerated it is to achieve the ideal equilibrium. Compared with the initial willingness of financing platforms to “transform”, the initial willingness of local governments to “guide” and financing platforms to “lend” is more important, and the negative attitude of either party of the latter will eventually lead to the failure of platform transformation. (3)Random disturbance will increase the uncertainty of the strategic choices of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions, and aggravate the irregular movement of the strategies of all parties. Although it will not change the system ESS, it will reduce the possibility of realizing the ideal state that local governments and financial institutions fully support platform transformation and financing platforms themselves are willing to transform.
It should be pointed out that this paper only focuses on the interactive decision-making behavior of local governments, financing platforms and financial institutions. However, there are many stakeholders involved in the transformation of financing platforms, and the interest relationship between local governments and financing platforms is complicated. Therefore, more systematic and comprehensive research can be carried out on the basis of introducing more stakeholders and fully clarifying the multi-interest relationship in the future.

Key words: financing platform, market-oriented transformation, evolutionary game, system simulation