关键词: 网络游戏, 监管模式, 演化博弈, 优化推演

Abstract: In recent years, China's online game industry has experienced a significant and sustainable growth as a crucial component of the country's digital content sector, and gained a considerable industrial momentum and cultural influence. The influx of capital has infused vitality into the industry, whereas it has also introduced latent risks, necessitating more stringent and comprehensive online game supervision. Presently, academic circles primarily analyze and evaluate game supervision either at an overarching level or by examining the conduct of game manufacturers. However, it is essential to consider the two crucial stages of game development: publishing and operation. Consequently, regulatory efforts must encompass both stages. In light of the existing research and the current realities of regulatory challenges in China's online game industry, this study aims to optimize the regulatory model based on the distinct characteristics of game publishing and operation.
Firstly, this paper identifies the relevant stakeholders and their decision-making behaviors involved in the process of publishing and operating online games while making key assumptions for the game model. Secondly, based on the aforementioned assumptions, an evolutionary game model for regulatory authorities and online game manufacturers during the stages of game publishing approval and operation is developed. By conducting a partial equilibrium stability analysis, the evolutionary stable strategies and the impact of significant parameters during both stages are determined. The resulting stable strategy set from both stages is then combined to achieve a comprehensive equilibrium solution for the entire evolutionary game model. Thirdly, dynamic optimization deduction is employed to analyze the behavior transformation process during the stages of game publishing and operation, validating prior inferences. Moreover, considering the actual supervision practices of online games in China during both stages, the optimal approval and supervision approaches are proposed, respectively. Finally, based on the stability analysis and dynamic optimization deduction of the evolutionary game, this paper presents optimization suggestions for China's online game industry supervision.
The findings indicate that during the stage of online game publishing and approval, regardless of whether regulatory authorities opt for strict or lenient approval strategies, game manufacturers tend to publish and submit games that breach regulations due to reduced publishing costs and the limited sunk costs of not obtaining version number approval. The current approval model fails to effectively control the illicit distribution of games. Consequently, relevant regulatory authorities should suspend the approval and issuance of game version numbers to regulate the online game market environment. In the stage of online game operation, the supervision of online game operation is in a transitional phase of mature development. During this stage, the level of supervision has undergone a process from strict regulation to non-regulation and back to strict supervision. Game manufacturers should also gradually transit to compliant operation strategies, taking into account the increased strictness of supervision and penalties. Ultimately, a balanced state is reached between the two where supervision becomes effective.
Drawing upon the model establishment and analysis process, this paper proposes the following regulatory optimization suggestions: Firstly, suspending the approval of game version numbers may do more harm than good, and thus, the game access system should be improved and optimized. The suspension of game version number approval has impeded the growth of domestic game manufacturers, limited choices for domestic online game players, and hindered the development of aesthetic identification abilities. To supervise online gameapprovals more effectively, the examination and approval system should be improved by clarifying the power and responsibility of each supervision entity. Secondly, the supervision mechanism for the game operation process should be enhanced, and a game classification review system should be established. Considering the unique situation of the country, a game grading review system should be implemented, accompanied by flexible review standards and a strict implementation of the real-name certification system to standardize game behavior and safeguard the rights and interests of game manufacturers and players. Thirdly, promoting diversified regulatory bodies and strengthening industry autonomy are crucial. Relying solely on government supervision departments to regulate the entire game industry is challenging, and it is necessary to establish and improve a seamless reporting and feedback mechanism to involve society, schools, and families in the supervision process. Concurrently, industry self-examination and responsibility should be strengthened, and the social responsibility of game manufacturers should be publicized and enhanced.

Key words: online game, supervision mode, evolutionary game, optimization deduction