关键词: 农村金融, 贷款质量意识, 演化博弈

Abstract: In recent years, the default of agricultural loans in China has become increasingly serious. According to the data from the State Financial Supervision and Administration Bureau, as of the end of 2021, the non-performing loan ratio of rural commercial banks was 3.63%, which is 2.82 times that of large commercial banks, 2.37 times that of joint-stock commercial banks, and 1.68 times that of urban commercial banks. The high default rate of agricultural loans has caused rural financial institutions to fear and hesitate in lending, which has dragged down their economic performance, affected the expansion of rural loan scale, and become a key factor restricting the sustainable development of rural finance. Loan quality awareness reflects the attitudes and perceptions of borrowers and lenders towards loan behavior, and is the foundation and logical starting point for loan behavior. It involves the control of loan quality projects by credit officers and the evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of loan projects by farmers. So naturally, there is a question of whether the higher awareness of loan quality among both borrowers and lenders can curb agricultural loan defaults, alleviate credit rationing in the agricultural loan market, and promote the construction of a healthy agricultural loan market. The answer to the question is a fundamental issue in the development of agricultural loan market. It not only helps reduce agricultural loan defaults and fill the gap between supply and demand in the agricultural loan market, but also has important guiding significance for reversing the problem of rural financial institutions leaving agriculture and funds leaving agriculture. However, it is often overlooked by academia and financial regulatory authorities.
This paper uses evolutionary game theory and simulation technology to study the impact of loan quality awareness on the evolution of behavioral strategies of farmers and loan officers. The results show that when the loan quality awareness of farmers and credit officers tends to weaken, the game system will converge to the situation where farmers submit low-quality loan projects, and credit officers accept low-quality loan projects. In this case, farmers' loan defaults are rampant, so the farmers' loan market order is severely disrupted. Rural commercial banks appear to be reluctant to lend and afraid of lending, so a unilateral rural financial market that only deposits but does not lend forms. When the credit officer's awareness of loan quality is strong and the farmer's awareness of loan quality is random, the game system will converge to the situation where the credit officer accepts the high-quality loan projects and the farmer submits the high-quality loan projects. In this case, all the credit officers are interested in high-quality loan projects, and the farmers choose to submit high-quality loan projects. The whole farmers' loan market is composed of low-risk farmers, so a healthy and sustainable agricultural loan market is established. When the credit officer's awareness of loan quality is strong and the farmer's awareness of loan quality is weak, the game system will converge to the situation where farmers submit low-quality loan projects and credit officers accept high-quality loan projects. And the widening gap between supply and demand of loan quality leads to serious credit rationing in the farmers' loan market.

Key words: rural finance, awareness of loan quality, evolutionary game