关键词: 智慧城市, 信息安全服务, 演化博弈, 动态奖惩机制

Abstract: With the popularization of smart city construction around the world, the issue of information security is getting more and more attention from all walks of life. At the same time, the demand for information security from various organizations or individuals is rising, and their requirements for the quality of information security services when using smart city-related products are also on the rise. Due to the information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior of enterprises, the quality of information security services will be greatly reduced, which will lead to information security problems not to be solved fundamentally. For this reason, it is important for the government to control the quality of information security services in smart cities by formulating scientific and reasonable regulatory measures. And how to balance the conflict between the interests of various subjects and improve the efficiency of regulation is the key to maintaining the benign operation of information security services in smart cities. In order to solve this problem, this paper transforms it into a game optimization problem for solving. Specifically, the government and smart city information security service provider present a dynamic game process, that is, both sides of the strategic behavior will be affected by the other party’s behavior and change. First, in the dynamic game process, what factors will the two sides face? Second, in addition to some necessary factors, what other influencing factors or subjects exist that are specific to the smart city context? Third, is there an effective mechanism optimizing the gaming system?
This paper focuses on the problem of regulating the quality of information security services in smart cities. In order to solve this problem, we firstly choose the key variables based on literature and practice. In order to be closer to the actual situation, this paper further considers user participation, because users are the important subject of service quality. In order to explore the impact of regulatory mechanisms on this problem, we include the game problem under different reward and punishment mechanisms and explore the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the game subjects. The analysis results show that among the four different reward and punishment mechanisms, dynamic reward and static punishment are the optimal mechanisms. We observe the changes of the game system by regulating the reward ceiling value, the punishment ceiling value and the user feedback probability, and propose targeted strategies from both government and user perspectives. Future research can consider two directions: first, in the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the strategy choice of the game subject does not necessarily present a linear relationship with the reward and punishment upper limit value, but may be a nonlinear relationship. How to effectively model the relationship between the game subject and key variables can be explored in depth; second, in the process of regulating the quality of information security services in smart cities in addition to the two parties in the text, it will also involve the central government, social media and other subjects of the decision-making behavior of the impact of the central government, so more participants can be considered in the future.

Key words: smart city, information security service, evolutionary game, dynamic reward and punishment mechanism