关键词: 国家高新区, 高新技术产业, 耦合协同, 演化博弈

Abstract: The soul of high-tech zone is innovation and development. Meanwhile, high-tech zone is also the result of industrial spatial agglomeration of high-tech enterprises. The development of national high-tech zones will produce agglomeration effect, siphon effect and technological innovation effect on the high-tech industry, and in turn, the high-tech industry will affect the development of national high-tech zones through policy effect, human capital, science and technology. The action and reaction between the two can be expressed as the ability and degree of their collaborative development. In the process of rapid and high-speed development, the mutual influence and interaction between the two cannot be separated from the participation of the core subject high-tech enterprises and academic and research institutions. The joint development of national high-tech zones and high-tech industries is essentially an operation mode of innovation chain, and the operation of innovation chain cannot be separated from the dynamic game between participants. From the perspective of collaboration, the coupling of the two subsystems requires the cooperation of different participants, and whether it is a national high-tech zone or a high-tech industry, the participants are all stakeholders. When making coupled cooperative decision, the decision-making subject will consider the influence of other subject’s decision and the cost and benefit of coupling cooperation. The action process of national high-tech zones and high-tech industries is to participate in the inter-subject game process. The win-win situation and information in coupling coordination are not fully in line with the cooperation and uncertainty of the game. The behavior strategies of participants will influence each other, and the cooperation also has the characteristics of dynamic repetition. Participants make judgment according to cost and benefit in the process of coordination. From the perspective of coupling mechanism, how the core players involved in the collaborative development of national high-tech zones and high-tech industries carry out game evolution, and how to construct the selection strategy that fits the tacit understanding mechanism of the core players based on different scenarios are the core of this paper.
Depending on the coupling mechanism and under the premise of incomplete rationality, the strategies adopted by the two types of subjects can be divided into “cooperation” and “non-cooperation”. The cooperation and income of subjects under different market and government supervision mechanisms are evaluated, and its value coordination mechanism is determined in the form of contract. Due to the limited rationality and the incompleteness of contract, the cooperative cooperation between the two subjects has certain moral hazard. The evolutionary game method is widely used in the study of the dynamic process evolution of the system, and the two sides achieve a higher level of interaction, trial and error and coupling between the high-tech zone and high-tech industry through collaborative cooperation. Therefore, the coupling coordination between high-tech enterprises and research institutions is the key to studying this problem. Based on the above research objectives, this paper carries out a systematic analysis of the player’s strategy selection along the path of “basic hypothesis - different mechanism model construction - numerical analysis - random disturbance analysis”. In the conventional evolutionary game, the player’s strategy has an important impact on whether the national high-tech zone and high-tech industry can achieve a high level of coupling and collaborative development, and the player’s evolution strategy is different under different mechanisms. However, the player’s state and other factors may affect the player’s strategy choice, so it is necessary and practical to construct a stochastic evolutionary model to test the influence of uncertain factors on the evolutionary system.
The evolutionary game model is introduced into the coupling framework of the two subsystems, and the coupling coordination interest relationship of the two sub-systems is constructed from the two aspects of market mechanism and government regulation. The system stability conditions and equilibrium points are obtained by evolutionary game method, and the evolutionary stability of the factors affecting the coupling coordination dynamics of the main body under the two mechanisms is analyzed by simulation. Random interference factors are introduced to analyze the influence of game system. The results show that under the market mechanism, the benefit distribution ratio, cost allocation ratio, risk factor size and penalty for breach of contract have obvious effects on high-tech enterprises and institutions to support the coupling coordination activities of the two subsystems, but the mechanism is different. Under the supervision of the government, the behaviors of the game parties change with the change of regulation intensity. In addition to the income distribution coefficient, risk coefficient, cost allocation ratio and penalty damages, the government’s incentive, subsidy factor and tax reduction and exemption intensity of the coupling coordination mechanism will have an impact on the evolutionary game system. Considering random interference factors, random interference factors will slow down the speed of high-tech enterprises and institutions to evolve into stable strategies.

Key words: national high-tech zone, high-tech industry, coupling synergy, evolutionary game