买方抗衡势力对上游企业定价形式决策的影响——基于讨价还价博弈的分析

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0106

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (5): 37-44.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0106

买方抗衡势力对上游企业定价形式决策的影响——基于讨价还价博弈的分析

李凯, 李伟, 安岗

东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳 110169

收稿日期:2014-07-31 出版日期:2017-05-25
作者简介:李凯(1957-),男,辽宁昌图人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:公司治理、产业组织理论等;李伟(1989-),男,安徽六安人,博士研究生,研究方向:纵向关系理论;安岗(1970-),男,陕西富平人,博士,讲师,研究方向:产业组织与契约理论。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150,71472032)

Study of Impacts of Countervailing Power on Upstream Firm's Pricing Form Decisions ——Based on Bargaining Game Analysis

LI Kai, LI Wei, AN Gang

School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China

Received:2014-07-31 Online:2017-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于上游垄断、下游双寡头竞争的纵向市场结构,在讨价还价博弈的框架下,构建了下游零售商均无买方抗衡势力和单个零售商具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下的,上游供应商最优定价形式决策模型,分析了买方抗衡势力对供应商定价形式决策的影响。研究发现:从供应商利润角度来说,当零售商均无买方抗衡势力时,两部收费制和RPM(转售价格维持)是等价的,且都优于线性定价;当单个零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,RPM优于两部收费制,同时也优于线性定价,但是两部收费制与线性定价之间的关系不确定。在此结论之上,本文还讨论了政府对RPM采用不同规制政策时,供应商最优的定价形式选择。

关键词: 定价形式, 买方抗衡势力, 讨价还价, 线性定价, 两部收费制, RPM

Abstract: Based on a vertical market structure consisting of a monopoly in the upstream and duopoly in the downstream, this paper builds a model of optimal pricing form decision of upstream supplier in two different situations—neither retailer has countervailing power, and a single retailer has countervailing power—in the framework of the bargaining game to analyze the impact of countervailing power on pricing form decision of supplier. The study finds: from the perspective of supplier's profits, when neither retailer has countervailing power, two-part tariff and RPM(resale price maintenance)are equivalent, and both are superior to linear pricing. However, when a single retailer has countervailing power, RPM is superior to two-part tariff, also superior to linear pricing. But the relationship between the two-part tariff and linear pricing is not clear. Based on those conclusions, the paper also discusses supplier's optimal choice of pricing form when government takes different regulation policies on RPM.

Key words: pricing form, countervailing power, bargaining, linear pricing, two-part tariff, RPM

中图分类号:

F272.3

李凯, 李伟, 安岗. 买方抗衡势力对上游企业定价形式决策的影响——基于讨价还价博弈的分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(5): 37-44.

LI Kai, LI Wei, AN Gang. Study of Impacts of Countervailing Power on Upstream Firm's Pricing Form Decisions ——Based on Bargaining Game Analysis[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(5): 37-44.

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买方抗衡势力对上游企业定价形式决策的影响——基于讨价还价博弈的分析

Study of Impacts of Countervailing Power on Upstream Firm's Pricing Form Decisions ——Based on Bargaining Game Analysis

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