积分通用计划下零售商的联盟与利润分配

doi:10.12005/orms.2022.0264

运筹与管理 ›› 2022, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (8): 150-155.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2022.0264

积分通用计划下零售商的联盟与利润分配

高举红, 王朋硕

天津大学管理与经济学部,天津 300072

收稿日期:2020-07-13 出版日期:2022-08-25 发布日期:2022-09-14
作者简介:高举红(1966-),女,天津人,副教授,博士,研究方向为供应链管理与物流工程;王朋硕(1997-),女,河北邢台人,硕士,研究方向为管理科学与工程。
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学规划项目(16YJAZH010)

Retailers' decision and Profit Distribution under a Point-sharing Policy

GAO Ju-hong, WANG Peng-shuo

College of Management and Economic, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China

Received:2020-07-13 Online:2022-08-25 Published:2022-09-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 会员积分策略如今已经成为零售商普遍的促销手段,许多行业的零售商形成同业联盟或异业联盟,利用积分通用计划来提高业绩。在积分通用计划的背景下,考虑到零售商各自的促销与联盟之间零售商的竞争,本文旨在研究同业联盟零售商之间的积分转换比例与促销水平决策问题,使联盟总利润最大化,并在此基础上利用积分成本共担机制解决集中决策下利润分配不合理的问题。通过数值算例验证了所得结论的重要性,为零售商进行联盟合作伙伴的选择提供了参考意见。

关键词: 积分通用计划, 联盟, 利润分配, 积分成本共担

Abstract: Consumption-point scheme has been commonly used by retailers recently. Retailers make coalition not only within the same industries, but also across industry borders and use consumption-point-sharing policy to improve sales. On the one hand, this policy will allow customers to redeem points and use them in different stores flexibly. On the other hand, the point costs created by one retailer in the coalition may be partly paid by others. Therefore, a fair method to split the profit is essential. Taking into account the retailers'respective promotions and competition between coalition retailers, this study aims to address retailers'equilibrium decisions of the point-conversion ratio and promotion level and maximize the total profit. Then, by using the point-cost-allocation mechanism, this paper will split the total profit under centralized control between coalition retailers reasonably. The validity of conclusions is verified by numerical examples. Moreover, management insights are provided for the selection of the partners.

Key words: point-sharing policy, coalition, profit distribution, point-cost-allocation

中图分类号:

F272

高举红, 王朋硕. 积分通用计划下零售商的联盟与利润分配[J]. 运筹与管理, 2022, 31(8): 150-155.

GAO Ju-hong, WANG Peng-shuo. Retailers' decision and Profit Distribution under a Point-sharing Policy[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2022, 31(8): 150-155.

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积分通用计划下零售商的联盟与利润分配

Retailers' decision and Profit Distribution under a Point-sharing Policy

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