关键词: 军民融合, 国防知识产权, 合作机制, 政府监管, 三方演化博弈

Abstract: The defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration is a joint investment of superior resources from both military and civilian enterprises. The cooperation aims to develop the defense intellectual property that meets their needs, which in turn promotes the two-way development of national defense construction and national economy. How to encourage and deepen the defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration, and solve the problems such as unclear ownership of property rights, barriers to information communication, and disputes in interest distribution of cooperation are crucial to promoting the in-depth development of civil-military integration.
Current studies on defense intellectual property cooperation are limited to qualitative analysis, lacking the construction of the evolutionary game model on defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration. Therefore, we explore the cooperation mechanism of defense intellectual property in the context of civil-military integration by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model with military firms, civilian firms, and the government as game subjects. Several typical characteristics of civil-military integration, such as the national defense benefits, risk aversion, and information communication costs are included in the tripartite evolutionary game model.
The experimental analysis process is as follows: First, we clarify the ownership of defense intellectual property and put forward hypotheses on the cooperation. Second, we construct the tripartite benefit matrix of the evolutionary game model to establish the replicator dynamics equations. Third, according to the replicator dynamics equations, we obtain the Jacobian matrix and obtain the eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix. Finally, we analyze the evolutionary stability strategies and investigate the critical factors affecting the stability of cooperation through numerical simulation. We discuss the evolutionary state of the system under different government subsidy coefficients, income distribution coefficients, default penalties, and information communication costs.
The results show that the stability of defense intellectual property cooperation is positively correlated with the penalty for breach of contract and negatively correlated with the information communication cost. And there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the stability of cooperation and the income distribution coefficient. The subsidy and punishment of the government are crucial to the stability of cooperation. Military firms are more sensitive to government policies and the penalty for breach of contract, while civilian firms are more sensitive to the information communication cost. We will also determine the effective interval of the income distribution coefficient and the government subsidy coefficient when the state of the optimal game strategy is stable.
Based on the evolutionary game model, this study broadens the research methods of defense intellectual property cooperation under the participation of the government. At the same time, according to the characteristics of defense intellectual property cooperation under the background of civil-military integration, we include the national defense benefits, risk aversion, information communication costs, as well as the government’s social benefits and loss of credibility into the evolutionary game model, which is an extension of the existing evolutionary game model on the intellectual property cooperation in the field of civil-military integration. Moreover, we consider the government’s penalties for breach of contract, which is ignored in current evolutionary game models on civil-military integration.
From the aspects of government subsidies, income distribution, default penalties, and information communication, corresponding countermeasure suggestions are proposed for improving the stability of cooperation. The government should reasonably adjust the fund subsidy coefficient and tax support coefficient. To improve the willingness to cooperate, the government can formulate corresponding incentive policies, provide certain tax incentives and strengthen intellectual property protection. Civilian and military firms should determine a reasonable income distribution coefficient, objectively and accurately measure the contribution of the enterprise from various aspects, and establish an effective interest balance mechanism. Both enterprises and governments should provide effective punishment mechanisms for breach of contract to maintain the loyalty of cooperative subjects and enhance mutual trust through better communication. Moreover, we should promote the construction of information-sharing platforms between military and civilian firms, in order to reduce the cost of information communication and promote technology integration and innovation. Military enterprises can appropriately open the information at a low secret level to civil enterprises, and timely decrypt the technical information that is not currently classified, so as to promote the conversion of military technology to civilian use.
However, there are some limitations in our research. First, we do not consider the attitude of military and civilian firms toward different risk types. The cost of risk can be introduced to reflect the attitude of risk, and the degree of risk avoidance to different risk types can be described according to the size of different risk costs. Second, we do not consider universities and scientific research institutions, which can also participate in the research and development of defense intellectual property. Therefore, universities or scientific research institutions can be included as the subjects of the gaming model in subsequent studies for further research.

Key words: civil-military integration, defense intellectual property, cooperation mechanism, government supervision, tripartite evolutionary game