关键词: 供应链管理, 公平关切, 期权合约, 供应链协调

Abstract: A properly designed option contract can coordinate the supply chain with rational channel members. This paper studies a supply chain system in which the retailer exhibits the behavior of fairness concerns. We examine the retailer’s optimal ordering decision with an option contract and provide conditions under which the supply chain can be coordinated. The results show that the retailer’s preference for fairness has significant influences on channel coordination with option contracts. Although the pricing rule of coordinative option contract keeps unchanged when the retailer becomes fairness-concerned, the possible maximum profit that the supplier can squeeze by an option contract will decrease with the degree of fairness concerns. Moreover, the selective range of the option contracts that can coordinate the supply chain shrinks and even disappears as the degree of the retailer’ fairness concerns increases. Numerical examples further verify these findings, and illustrate that even if an option contract can coordinate the supply chain, the fairness-concerned retailer could reject it because of its negative utility.

Key words: supply chain management, fairness concerns, option contract, supply chain coordination