运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (10): 101-105.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0240

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于供应链金融的中小企业信贷市场演化分析

李小莉1, 辛玉红2   

  1. 1.暨南大学 管理学院,广东 广州 510632;
    2.广东技术师范学院 会计学院,广东 广州 510665;
  • 收稿日期:2015-09-21 出版日期:2017-10-25
  • 作者简介:李小莉(1988-),女,湖南邵阳人,博士研究生,研究方向:供应链金融、项目集成化管理;辛玉红(1971-),女,博士,教授,研究方向:供应链与物流管理、复杂系统建模与仿真。

Evolution Analysis of SMEs’ Credit Market Based on Supply Chain Finance

LI Xiao-li1, XIN Yu-hong2   

  1. 1.School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China;
    2.School of Accountancy, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou 510665, China;
  • Received:2015-09-21 Online:2017-10-25

摘要: 根据演化博弈论,分别构建了供应链金融模式及传统融资模式下中小企业信贷市场的演化博弈模型,比较分析了两种模式下中小企业信贷市场的演化规律,探析了供应链金融对中小企业信贷市场的影响。研究表明,在传统融资模式下,系统不存在稳定汇入点,信贷市场不稳定,中小企业较难获得银行贷款;而在供应链金融模式下,系统的演化将收敛于银行贷款、企业履约的稳定状态,中小企业信贷市场呈良性发展。最后,通过数值分析对模型结论的有效性进一步验证。

关键词: 演化博弈论, 供应链金融, 中小企业信贷市场

Abstract: According to the evolutionary game theory, evolutionary game models of the SMEs’ loan market are established respectively under the traditional mode and supply chain finance mode, and the evolving rules of SMEs’ credit market are analyzed. Then, the impact of supply chain finance on SMEs’ credit market is discussed. The results show that the system is not stable under the traditional mode, so it is difficult for SMEs to obtain bank loans. On the contrary, the system is in a stable state under the supply chain finance mode, and the SMEs’ loan market develops well. At last, the results are validated with numerical analysis.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, supply chain finance, SMEs’ loan market

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