Abstract: Public participation affects the government decision-making on public affairs. In the game between the local government and public, the improvement of convergence speed can reduce the game cost and improve the social efficiency. Based on large engineering a dynamic game process of local government and the public is set. With the Markov decision process applied , we find game convergence conditions and deduceoptimal stopping condition when local governments take compromise strategy. We obtainthe relationship between tolerance degrees, compromise probability of local government and game convergence speed. The results show that the expected economic returns of major projects are positively related to the local government's tolerance of local instability. The local government’s tolerance of local instability is inversely related to the convergence rate of the decision-making game of large-scale projects, and the influence of public support on local tolerance varies according to probability distribution.

Key words: major project decision making, behavior preference, public will, tolerability

摘要： 在公共事务决策中公众参与正影响着地方政府决策。基于博弈视角在地方政府与公众的策略互动中,博弈收敛速度的提高能够降低双方的成本从而提高社会效率。建立基于大工程议案决策的地方政府与公众动态博弈过程,应用马尔可夫决策研究博弈收敛的条件并分析了基于折扣准则下地方政府采取妥协策略时的最优停止条件。讨论了地方政府对不稳定的容忍度、地方政府选择妥协的概率与博弈收敛速度三者之间的关系。研究表明大工程预期经济收益指标与地方政府对地方不稳定的容忍度呈正向关系,地方政府对地方不稳定的容忍度与双方关于大工程议案决策博弈的收敛速度呈反向关系,且公众支持度对地方容忍度的影响依概率分布变化。

关键词: 大工程决策, 行为偏好, 公众意愿, 容忍度