Abstract: Due to the important correlation between rare earths and new energy technology products such as wind turbines, new energy drive motors, and nickel hydrogen batteries, in recent years, local governments in China have built collaborative innovation platforms, developed a series of incentive industrial development policies such as financial subsidies and tax incentives, to promote rare earth industry and new energy industry to strengthen resources sharing and strive to break through the bottlenecks of industrial technology. However, there are some drawbacks in the mechanism of collaborative innovation of rare earth industry, new energy industry that is led by local government, such as the weakened effect of local government leading function, the low motivation and efficiency of industries which participate in it. According to these shortages, the tripartite evolutionary game model about collaboration innovation, guided by local government, and led by rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises, is constructed. In order to figure out the game evolution strategies of local government, rare earth enterprise and new energy enterprise in different situations, the strategy choices among the three parties during the collaborative innovation process are analyzed.
Providing the collaboration innovation center constructed by three parties as a case, where the Jiangxi Provincial Government and Ganzhou Municipal Government are the government side, Jiangxi Jinli Permanent Magnet Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Jinli Permanent Magnet”) is the rare earth enterprise side, and Xinjiang Jinfeng Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Jinfeng Technology”) is the new energy enterprise side, the factors that influence the strategy choices of their collaboration are studied by simulation. In this article, the local government data is obtained through relevant policies and documents, and the research and development costs and tax refund data of Jinli Permanent Magnet and Jinfeng Technology are obtained from the annual reports of listed companies on CNINFO (www.cninfo.com.cn). The paper analyzes the impact of the initial willingness of participating entities, local government subsidies, regulatory efforts, and losses on the evolution results using Matlab R2018b software.
Based on the above analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1)Local governments decide whether rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises choose to participate in collaborative innovation. When local governments show high willingness to actively implement policies, regardless of whether one of the rare earth enterprises or new energy enterprises has a high willingness, the other party will choose to participate. (2)The willingness and evolutionary path of rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises to participate are not affected by each other's initial intentions. Compared to rare earth enterprises, the decrease in participation willingness of new energy enterprises has a more significant impact on the speed of local governments' evolution towards active promotion. (3)When the subsidies provided by local governments for collaborative innovation are within a critical range, the amount of subsidies is proportional to the rate at which rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises evolve towards participation. Local governments, rare earth enterprises, and new energy enterprises are stable in their ideal strategies. When the critical value is exceeded, local governments, rare earth enterprises, and new energy enterprises do not meet the stability conditions. (4)High intensity supervision and evaluation by local governments, as well as fines for violations, are effective strategies to promote the participation of rare earth and new energy enterprises. The losses caused by the passive implementation of local governments are important factors that hinder their active implementation.
The results reveal that: (1)The willingness of rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation is not affected by each other's initial willingness, but accelerated with the improvement of local governments' willingness to actively implement policies. (2)The incentive and supervision intensity of local governments is positively correlated to the willingness of rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation.(3)The greater the cost of local government laziness and inaction, the more inclined it is to choose the “active implementation” strategy.
This paper conducts simulations on local governments and enterprises based on evolutionary game theory, and draw some important conclusions. However, due to the limitations of survey objects and conditions, the assignment of payment matrix parameters only reflects the typical situation of enterprises, lacking a large amount of data support. There is a certain gap between our work and the reality.

Key words: local government, rare earth enterprise, new energy enterprise, collaborative innovation, evolutionary game

摘要： 协同创新是加快新兴技术深度交叉融合、产业链向高端化延伸的重要途径。本文从系统角度出发,构建地方政府、稀土企业、新能源企业三方演化博弈模型,研究三方博弈策略选择的影响因素及其互动机制,并引入中国“稀土王国”赣州的企业案例,对博弈模型进行数值模拟分析。研究结果表明:稀土企业与新能源企业参与协同创新的意愿不受彼此初始意愿影响,而随地方政府积极推行政策意愿的提升而加快;地方政府激励和监管的强度与稀土企业、新能源企业参与协同创新的意愿正相关;地方政府懒政、不作为的代价越大,越倾向选择“积极推行”策略。其研究结论为地方政府制定协同创新及产业化管理机制提供了相关对策建议。

关键词: 地方政府, 稀土企业, 新能源企业, 协同创新, 演化博弈