Abstract: With the recent rise of mobile payments, the increasing frequency of e-commerce platforms employing big data price discrimination has attracted widespread attention from various sectors of society. The ability of e-commerce platforms to engage in extensive price discrimination is attributable, on one hand, to the inherentinformation asymmetry between these platforms and consumers, and on the other hand, to the insufficient emphasis on personal information protection and data security by the government, which allows companies to engage in big data price discrimination without restraint. The practice of e-commerce platforms using big data for price discrimination not only harms consumer welfare and disrupts market order but also hinders the long-term development of the platforms themselves.
In response to the current governance challenges posed by big data price discriminationon e-commerce platforms, the concept of data ownership was first introduced in China by the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 2021. Personal data protection in China has entered a substantive stage, opening a new chapter in the governance of the phenomenon of big data price discrimination by e-commerce platforms and providing consumers with highly advantageous legal tools. Therefore, based on this regulation, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with the government, e-commerce platforms, and consumers as the main stakeholders to explore the impact of strategies adopted by these stakeholders on the governance of big data price discrimination in the context of data rights confirmation.
Through the construction of dynamic replication equations and Jacobian matrices, this paper seeks to find the equilibrium points of the model. Using real-life data, it conducts a simulation analysis to assess the effectiveness of the model and the impact of relevant factors, which concludes: Firstly, whether consumers engage in price comparison is pivotal to the phenomenon of big data price discrimination by e-commerce platforms. Secondly, under the conditions of evolutionary stability, the government’s strategy choice is contingent upon the costs it incurs in market regulation and the promotion of data rights development. Thirdly, government penalties play a suppressive role in addressing big data price discrimination by e-commerce platforms, with harsher penalties resulting in stronger suppression. Lastly, the exercise of personal data rights by consumers can effectively mitigate instances of big data price discrimination by e-commerce platforms.
Based on the aforementioned conclusions, this paper presents the following policy recommendations. From a government perspective, the government in China should prioritize public awareness campaigns and engage in collaborative oversight with consumers, aiming to enhance consumers’ awareness of rights protection and their willingness to engage in price comparison. Additionally, government penalties for big data price discrimination by e-commerce platforms should not only concern the monetary aspect but also involve the disclosure of e-commerce platforms engaged in such practices through official channels, so as to lead public opinions to exerting pressure. From a consumer’s perspective, on one hand, it is essential to enhance one’s awareness of rights protection and remain vigilant against unethical conduct by e-commerce platforms. On the other hand, even after making a purchase, consumers can compare prices and actively exercise their personal data rights, thereby restraining big data price discrimination by e-commerce platforms from a post-purchase control standpoint.

Key words: big data price discrimination, data rights confirmation, e-commerce platforms, evolutionary game

摘要： 随着移动支付在近几年的崛起,电商平台利用大数据“杀熟”的现象愈发频繁,引发了社会各界人士的广泛关注。自深圳经济特区在今年首次提出数据确权的概念,个人数据保护在我国开始步入实质性阶段。为探讨数据确权背景下大数据“杀熟”的治理机制,本文建立了以政府、消费者和电商平台为主体的三方演化博弈模型,并得出以下结论:①消费者是否比价是大数据“杀熟”的关键;②在演化稳定的条件下,政府的策略选择取决于其在市场监管和促进数据权利发展方面投入的成本;③政府惩罚对电商平台大数据“杀熟”行为具有抑制作用,且惩罚越严厉,抑制作用越强;④消费者行使个人数据权利能够抑制大数据“杀熟”行为。最后,本文据此提出了相应的对策建议。

关键词: 大数据杀熟, 数据确权, 电商平台, 演化博弈