Abstract: With the acceleration of population aging, the home-based care model has become an effective solution to alleviating the pressure of pension. In recent years, the number of all kinds of home-based care service institutions in China has continued to increase. However, many institutions can’t achieve sustainable operation because of the high operating cost and low service level. Due to the lack of ability to pay and uneven service quality, the elderly’s high demand and willingness for home-based care services are inconsistent with their actual purchase behavior. To solve the above problems, the Chinese government has issued several policy documents, but the policy effects are different due to the different implementation objects and methods. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the influence of consumption subsidies and quality rewards and punishments on the decision-making of home-based care service institutions and the elderly.
Firstly, aiming at the home-based care supply chain, this paper constructs a game model in three situations: non-government intervention mechanism, consumption subsidy mechanism, and quality reward and punishment mechanism. Secondly, through backward induction, we get the optimal solution of the market price of home-based care service, the actual purchase price of the elderly, the market demand of home-based care service, the profit of home-based care service institutions, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Then, the optimal solutions of the three decision models are compared and analyzed, and the advantages and disadvantages of different mechanisms are discussed. Finally, in order to illustrate the validity of the model and verify the correctness of the proposition, we use the existing literature for reference to assign values to parameters, and use MATLAB to carry out numerical simulation under different conditions, and analyze the influence of quality improvement cost coefficient, government subsidies and rewards and punishments on the equilibrium results.
The results show that: (1)The consumption subsidy mechanism is superior to the quality reward and punishment mechanism and the non-government intervention mechanism in improving the purchasing power level of economic consumers, but it will also indirectly lead to the quality consumers needing to pay higher prices to obtain services. (2)The incentive effect of quality reward and punishment mechanism on improving service quality and purchasing demand of quality consumers is better than that of consumption subsidy mechanism and non-government intervention mechanism, and the policy benefits more widely. (3)When the quality standard of home-based aged care service or the improvement coefficient of quality cost is too high, it is difficult for home-based aged care service institutions to make up for the cost to their payment by improving the quality, resulting in their profits under the quality reward and punishment mechanism being lower than that those under the non-government intervention mechanism. (4)When the cost coefficient of quality improvement is too high, especially when the proportion of economic consumers is high, the government should choose to implement the consumption subsidy mechanism for the sake of protecting the needs of home-based care services for the elderly with financial difficulties and the interests of service organizations. (5)When the cost coefficient of quality improvement is low, the government should choose to implement the quality reward and punishment mechanism for the sake of promoting the high-quality development of home care services and improving the satisfaction of the elderly. Therefore, the government should flexibly adjust subsidies and rewards, and punishments on the premise of formulating scientific and reasonable quality standards for home care services.
There are still some shortcomings in this paper, such as not considering the influence of government budget constraints, asymmetric demand information, and other factors. The follow-up research can be further explored to provide a more comprehensive theoretical basis and decision support for the government to improve the regulation policy of home-based care services and promote the sustainable and healthy development of the home-based care supply chain.

Key words: home-based care, service supply chain, consumption subsidy, quality reward and punishment

摘要： 为研究消费补贴和质量奖惩对居家养老服务供应链的影响,构建无政府介入机制、消费补贴机制和质量奖惩机制下的博弈模型,比较分析不同机制的实施效果。研究表明:消费补贴机制更有利于提高低收入老年人的支付能力和改善服务机构的收益状况,但也会间接导致品质型消费者需要支付更高的价格来获得服务;质量奖惩机制对提升居家养老服务机构服务质量和品质型消费者购买需求的激励作用更强,政策受益面更广。政府应充分考虑老年人异质性特征和居家养老服务市场发展程度,分类施策、多措并举,在制定科学合理的居家养老服务质量标准的前提下灵活调整补贴和奖惩力度。在市场发展初期,尤其是质量改善成本系数较大和经济型消费者比例较高的情况下,通过设置高补贴、低奖惩来扩大市场需求,增加服务供给。随着市场逐渐成熟,居家养老服务机构提升服务质量的能力和老年人对服务质量的偏好提高,可以减少消费补贴,加强质量奖惩,以促进居家养老服务供应链高质量发展。

关键词: 居家养老, 服务供应链, 消费补贴, 质量奖惩