Abstract: With the intensification of global energy tension, China advocates the concept of green development and provides subsidies for energy-saving products. However, the implementation of subsidy policies has also caused the following two problems. Firstly, government subsidies lead to market distortion, resulting in resource waste and low efficiency. Secondly, continuous subsidies impose a burden on government finances and even trigger financial crises. In order to effectively address these issues, the government has begun to implement subsidy reduction policies. However, how to effectively withdraw government subsidies in the field of green energy conservation, and how to design the terms for government subsidy withdrawal? How should enterprises respond to subsidy reduction policies? All these issues are worthy of in-depth research.
In fact, the government mainly considers the following two environmental performance goals when designing subsidy reduction policies. Based on the above situation, this article mainly focuses on the following issues. Firstly, how should the optimal subsidy reduction coefficient of the government be set under two environmental performance objectives? What is the difference between the two? Secondly, how can enterprises make optimal decisions under the government subsidy reduction mechanism? Thirdly, how does the subsidy reduction mechanism affect enterprises and consumers? The main marginal contributions of this study are as follows. On the one hand, considering the government decision-making under the subsidy reduction mechanism, the optimal energy-saving subsidy reduction clause is designed. On the other hand, the impact of subsidy reduction mechanisms is explored on the energy-saving index of green and durable products for enterprises under different environmental performance goals.
This research studies the mechanism of government subsidy reduction on green and durable products by constructing a three-stage game model, including the government, enterprises and consumers. On this basis, the focus is on designing the optimal terms for the energy-saving subsidy rebate mechanism for green and durable products under the two environmental performance objectives and analyzing the impact of the rebate mechanism on the decision-making of enterprises and consumers. Specifically, in the first stage, the government designs subsidy reduction clauses and decides on the optimal subsidy reduction coefficient. In the second stage, enterprises decide whether to produce ordinary products or green products based on the subsidy reduction policy and determine the energy-saving index and price of the products. In the third stage, consumers make purchasing decisions based on product type and price.
The research findings include: Firstly, the subsidy reduction coefficient is negatively correlated with the subsidy budget, and an increase in subsidy budget will promote enterprises to improve the energy-saving index of green products. Secondly, when the subsidy budget is low, there is no difference in the slope reduction clause between the two environmental performance objectives. When the subsidy budget is high, there will be differences in the optimal slope reduction clauses under the two environmental performance objectives, which are mainly related to the government budget level. Thirdly, under the subsidy rebate mechanism, enterprises will choose to produce different types of products based on the subsidy phasing-out coefficient. Only when the coefficient is low will enterprises choose to produce green products, and at this time, the optimal energy-saving index of the product is the minimum standard level stipulated by the government subsidy policy. In addition, under the objective of maximizing the overall energy-saving index, the optimal subsidy reduction clause will encourage enterprises to increase the energy-saving index of green products.

Key words: green durable product, subsidy of energy-saving, mechanism of phasing-out subsidies, subsidy budget

摘要： 建立“政府—企业—消费者”三阶段博弈模型,研究政府补贴退坡机制对绿色耐用产品的作用机理。在此基础上,重点考虑在最大化单位产品节能指数和最大化总节能指数两个环境绩效目标下,设计关于绿色耐用产品节能补贴退坡机制的最优条款,分析退坡机制对企业和消费者决策的影响。研究发现:(1)补贴退坡系数与政府补贴预算负相关,且政府补贴预算增加会促进企业提高绿色产品节能指数;(2)当政府补贴预算较低时,两种环境绩效目标下的退坡条款无差异;但当政府补贴预算较高时,两种环境绩效目标下的最优退坡条款存在差异且主要与政府预算水平相关;(3)补贴退坡机制下,企业会根据补贴退坡系数选择生产不同类型的产品,当补贴退坡系数较小时企业才会选择生产绿色产品,且此时产品最优节能指数为政府补贴政策规定最低标准水平。此外,研究还发现在最大化总节能指数目标下,最优补贴退坡条款会促使企业提高绿色产品节能指数。

关键词: 绿色耐用产品, 节能补贴, 退坡机制, 补贴预算