An Analysis of the Stability of International Environmental Agreements Based on Repeated Games

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2013, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (3): 16-20.

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An Analysis of the Stability of International Environmental Agreements Based on Repeated Games

CUI Zhi-wei¹, LI Zi-ran², ZHANG Jin³, ZU Lei⁴

1. School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China;
2. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
3. School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;
4. School of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China

Received:2011-02-23 Online:2013-06-25

国际环境公约稳定性的重复博弈分析

崔志伟¹, 李自然², 张锦³, 祖垒⁴

1.北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京 100191;
2.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京 100190;
3.对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京 100029;
4.中央财经大学管理科学与工程学院,北京 100081

作者简介:崔志伟(1982-),男,讲师,博士;李自然(1981-),男,助理研究员,博士;张锦(1974-),女,讲师,博士;祖垒(1975-),男,副教授,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71001002,71133001,71073019);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(YWF-10- 02-103)

Abstract

Abstract: In this paper, the efficiency of International Environmental Agreements(IEAs)is defined in terms of emission reducing and maximizing joint social welfare. It emphasizes IEAs' improvement on the social welfare without increasing the pollution. For the simultaneous model in Carraro & Siniscalco(1993)and Hoel(1992), we show that the outcome of full cooperation is efficient but not stable. When the benchmark model is extended to infinitely repeated game, we show that full cooperation is supported by subgame perfect equilibrium. And, the lower bound of the discount factor is also provided.

Key words: environmental economics, international environmental agreements, repeated game, efficiency, stability

摘要： 国际环境公约的有效性包括减排有效性与社会福利有效性两个方面,强调一个有效的国际环境公约在减排的前提下提高社会福利的功能。然而,基于Carraro & Siniscalco 1993和Hoel 1992的同时博弈模型,本文发现全合作是有效的却是不稳定的。将他们的模型拓展为无限期的重复博弈后,发现基于远期收益考虑的情况之下,一个全合作的国际环境公约是可以被子博弈完美均衡所支持的。另外,在证明中,本文也给出了折现因子的下界。

关键词: 环境经济学, 国际环境公约, 重复博弈, 有效性, 稳定性

CLC Number:

F062.6

CUI Zhi-wei, LI Zi-ran, ZHANG Jin, ZU Lei. An Analysis of the Stability of International Environmental Agreements Based on Repeated Games[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(3): 16-20.

崔志伟, 李自然, 张锦, 祖垒. 国际环境公约稳定性的重复博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(3): 16-20.

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An Analysis of the Stability of International Environmental Agreements Based on Repeated Games

国际环境公约稳定性的重复博弈分析

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