Channel Management and Analysis of Paradox in A Retailer-led Supply Chain

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2014, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (5): 1-8.

Channel Management and Analysis of Paradox in A Retailer-led Supply Chain

TIAN Xin^1,2, HOU Yu-mei^1,3, QIU Zhang-de^{4, 5}, DING Yu-zhang^{1, 5}

1. Research Center on Fictitious Economy & Data Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
2. Center for Transport, Trade and Financial Studies, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong;
3. School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China;
4. Institute of Information Science and Engineering, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai 200237, China;
5. Shanghai HEADING Information Engineering Co., Ltd., Shanghai 201112, China

Received:2013-10-22 Online:2021-05-25

零售商主导型供应链渠道管理与悖论机制分析

田歆^1,2, 侯玉梅^1,3, 邱张得^4,5, 丁玉章^1,5

1.中国科学院虚拟经济与数据科学研究中心,北京 100190;
2.香港城市大学航贸金融研究中心,香港;
3.燕山大学经济管理学院, 河北秦皇岛 066004;
4.华东理工大学信息科学与工程学院,上海 200237;
5.上海海鼎信息工程股份有限公司,上海 201112

通讯作者: 侯玉梅(1965-),女,博士,教授,研究方向:物流与供应链管理。
作者简介:田歆(1983-),男,博士,助理研究员,研究方向:物流与供应链管理;
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202114,71071134);“十二五”国家科技支撑计划项目(2013BAH11F03);中国科学院大学校长基金(Y35101KY00)

Abstract

Abstract: There is a hot paradox problem in business, i.e., the dominated retailers are considered to use powerful contracts such as returns and rebates squeeze suppliers, but in fact that suppliers have much higher profit margins than retailers. We establish and compare four increasingly stronger power retailer-led supply chain decision models: non-returns, common-returns, full-returns, full-returns and linear rebate without sale effort, full-returns and linear rebate with sale effort. We show that returns and rebates cannot bring more revenues for dominated retailer when supplier can determine the wholesale price of goods, and the dominated retailer should strengthen the impact on even control the wholesale pricing with channel power first. This paper explains the causes and effects of the business paradox between retailers and suppliers.

Key words: supply chain management, retailer-led supply chain, channel rebate, returns, sales effort, business paradox

摘要： 普遍认为零售企业压榨供应商、但实际上供应商利润率远高于零售商是业界关注的一个热点商业悖论问题。通过构建无退货、一般退货、全额退货、线性回扣等体现零售商不同强势地位的供应链渠道管理模型,研究并比较了退货和回扣等强势契约机制以及销售努力对零售供应链管理绩效的影响。分析表明供应商通过批发价定价可以有效转移强势契约带来的风险和成本支付,零售商不能通过强势契约显著提升零售供应链效益。零售商应该利用渠道优势首先强化对批发价定价权的影响,在此基础上合理采用强势契约机制。本文研究很好地解释了零供双方渠道地位与利润水平矛盾的商业悖论问题。

关键词: 供应链管理, 零售商主导型供应链, 渠道回扣, 退货, 销售努力, 商业悖论

CLC Number:

F253.2
C93

TIAN Xin, HOU Yu-mei, QIU Zhang-de, DING Yu-zhang. Channel Management and Analysis of Paradox in A Retailer-led Supply Chain[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(5): 1-8.

田歆, 侯玉梅, 邱张得, 丁玉章. 零售商主导型供应链渠道管理与悖论机制分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(5): 1-8.

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