Abstract: This paper analyzes the influence of policy instruments on firms' green technology innovation based on a three-stage game model. Results find that rate of emission tax and subsides on ER&D are conducive to firms' green technology innovation. Social optimal rate of corrective tax is lower than marginal social damage of pollution, and increases with equilibrium output. Government should use combination tools of emission tax and subsides when the spillover of green technology is very high while government should use combination tools of emission tax on polluting activities and research and development tax when spillover is low. When emission tax is exogenous, the subsidy in competition consition is higher than the subsidy in collabrative innovation condition. Government should use the combination tools to promote green technical innovation, especially the collabrate innovation, according to the industry spillover.

Key words: technology innovation, environmental policies, spillover, combination tools, collabrative innovation

摘要： 构建环境政策内生的三阶段博弈模型,分析存在技术溢出效应时,环境政策组合工具对企业绿色技术创新的影响。研究发现,排污税和研发补贴有利于企业进行绿色技术创新,两者组合可以实现社会福利最大化。社会最优排污税税率低于排污对社会的边际破坏程度,并随着均衡产量的增加而提高。在技术溢出效应较高时,政府采取排污税和补贴的组合工具,而当技术溢出效应较低时,政府采取排污税和研发税的组合工具。当排污税税率外生给定时,竞争创新情况下的政府补贴要高于协同创新情况下的政府补贴。政府应结合行业技术溢出特征,采取相应的税收与补贴结合的政策工具,并在知识产权保护的基础上,促进企业集群协同绿色技术创新。

关键词: 技术创新, 环境政策, 溢出效应, 组合工具, 协同创新