Abstract: The coordination equilibrium in supply chain is studied. This supply chain contains a supplier and two heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure. If a retailer does not want to share his information, then the other retailer and the supplier can only know his fuzzy information. The coordination results are not the same when the parameters of demand function are different. We propose the necessary condition under which some kind of coordination equilibrium exists. In the coordination equilibrium, the whole supply chain gets the win-win situation.

Key words: fuzzy set, valued-added, supply chain, game theory

摘要： 研究由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的供应链共享信息均衡问题。两个零售商具有不同的私有成本信息。当零售商不公开此成本信息时,其他的零售商和供应商只能推断出该信息的模糊分布。不同市场需求参数下,使零售商和供应商均达到最大利润的局势也有所不同。为了使供应链上的供应商和零售商达到双赢,分析了各同均衡策略存在的前提条件。

关键词: 模糊集, 加值, 供应链, 博弈论