Abstract: At present, China faces a serious problem with air pollution as primary pollutants PM2.5 have become the focus of the study and discussion. This article talks about how to form effective governance mechanism of joint regional air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei. First we develop the characteristic function of joint regional cooperation pollution governance and the participation level function of fuzzy cooperative game. Secondly we obtain cost allocation scheme combining the actual environmental data of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei with the method of Shapley value in fuzzy game. At last we analyze the relationship between cost allocation value and annual average concentration, the quantity of polluted days and other environmental indicators. The results show that the greater of the budget used for pollution control during the evaluation period, the smaller the cost allocation of participation level of the pollution. Annual average concentration and pollution days have direction relationship with the cost allocation value of participants. At the same time the effective investment in controlling pollution should be encouraged on the part of provinces or cities. In the initial investment, the greater the effect of the pollution governance, the better, and the smaller of post-cost allocation value. Accordingly, the effective cooperation economic benefit coordination mechanism and incentive mechanism of the pollution governance can effectively control joint regional atmospheric pollution.

Key words: joint regional air pollution control, cost allocation, fuzzy coalition, shapley value

摘要： 本文针对京津冀如何形成有效的跨域污染联合治理机制展开研究。首先构建了跨域合作污染治理的特征函数及模糊合作博弈的参与度函数。其次结合京津冀实际环境数据,利用模糊博弈Shapley值法获得合作省市成本分摊方案。最后分析了年平均浓度,年空气质量未达标天数及环境污染治理力对成本分摊值的影响关系。研究结果表明各省市在评价期内用于污染治理的资金预算越大,计算的模糊博弈参与度越小,且平均浓度及污染天数与成本分摊值成正比例关系,环境污染治理力与成本分摊值成反比例关系。同时应鼓励合作省市前期治污的有效投资,在前期投资越大治污效果越好,且后期成本分摊值就越小。据此本文建立的联合治污经济利益协调机制能对参与者起到有效激励的作用,促使跨域联合治污有效实施。

关键词: 跨域治污, 成本分摊, 模糊博弈, Shapley值