Incomplete Interval Cooperative Gamesand Its Application in Farmland Pollution Control

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0275

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (12): 81-86.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0275

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Incomplete Interval Cooperative Gamesand Its Application in Farmland Pollution Control

CHUN Sheng-ui¹, JIAN Lin²

1. Beijing Intelligent Logistics System Collaborative Innovation Center, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China;
2. College of Computer and Information Sciences, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350002, China

Received:2019-06-10 Online:2019-12-25

残缺区间合作博弈及其在农地污染治理中的应用

崔春生¹, 林健²

1. 北京物资学院北京市智能物流系统协同创新中心,北京 101149;
2. 福建农林大学计算机与信息学院,福建福州 350002

通讯作者: 林健(1983-),男,博士,副教授,研究方向:模糊决策与对策。
作者简介:崔春生(1974-),男,博士,副教授,研究方向:优化与决策
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601049); 北京市智能物流系统协同创新中心项目(BILSCIC-2018KF-11,BILSCIC-2019KF-16);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(16YJC630064); 福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2016J01282);福建省高校杰出青年科研人才培育计划资助项目:不完全合作博弈的成本分摊策略及其在水污染治理中的应用研究

Abstract

Abstract: interval cooperative game with incomplete profit value of coalition, the concept of incomplete interval cooperative game is defined. Based on the superadditivity of cooperative game, the consistency verification model of the interval profit value of coalition is established. By constructing the deviation between positive and negative ideal distribution and imputation vector, the interval Ideal-Shapley value solving model of incomplete interval cooperative game is given, and the rationality and existence of interval Ideal-Shapley value are analyzed. The above-mentioned model is used to solve the cost-saving allocation strategy for the joint treatment of agricultural land pollution, and the validity of the interval Ideal-Shapley value solution model is verified.

Key words: cooperative game, ideal imputation, Shapley value, pollution control

摘要： 针对联盟收益值部分未知的区间合作博弈,定义了残缺区间合作博弈的相关概念。基于合作博弈的超可加性,建立了联盟区间收益值的一致性验证模型。通过构造正、负理想分配及其与收益分配向量之间的偏差,给出了残缺区间合作博弈的区间Ideal-Shapley值求解模型,分析了区间Ideal-Shapley值的合理性与存在性。利用上述模型求解农地污染联合治理的节约成本分摊策略,验证了区间Ideal-Shapley值求解模型的有效性。

关键词: 合作博弈, 理想分配, Shapley值, 污染治理

CLC Number:

C934

CHUN Sheng-ui, JIAN Lin. Incomplete Interval Cooperative Gamesand Its Application in Farmland Pollution Control[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(12): 81-86.

崔春生, 林健. 残缺区间合作博弈及其在农地污染治理中的应用[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(12): 81-86.

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Incomplete Interval Cooperative Gamesand Its Application in Farmland Pollution Control

残缺区间合作博弈及其在农地污染治理中的应用

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