Abstract: In recent years, E-commerce platforms frequently have “deceitful pricing for acquaintances” by big data technology. How to strengthen supervision and protect the rights of consumers has attracted much attention among people. In order to reveal the decision-making mechanism of all parties in the phenomenon of “deceitful pricing for acquaintances”, an evolutionary game model based on prospect theory and mental account is constructed in this paper. It analyzes the game evolution process and stability strategy of e-commerce platform and government by income prospect sensing matrix which is from the pay account and gain account. Finally, numerical simulation demonstrates the factors of decision-making behavior. The results show that consumers reporting behavior can effectively inhibit the tendency of “deceitful pricing for acquaintances” of e-commerce platform and non-regulatory behaviors of governments; We can take actions to raise the reference point of the pay function and lower the reference point of the gain function. It can quickly reduce “deceitful pricing for acquaint-ances” and non-regulatory behaviors. The increase in penalties and in the percentage of deductions from governments can effectively reduce the tendency of “deceitful pricing for acquaintances" and encourage governments to evolve towards regulatory behavior.

Key words: prospect theory, mental account, behavior supervision, deceitful pricing for acquaintances, evolutionary game theory

摘要： 近年来,电商平台利用大数据技术对消费者“杀熟”的事件频繁发生,如何加强监管,保护消费者权益备受关注。为了揭示“杀熟”现象中各方的决策机理,提出了基于前景理论与心理账户的演化博弈模型。通过建立电商平台、政府部门成本账户和效价账户的前景收益感知矩阵,分析了电商平台与政府部门的博弈演化过程及稳定策略,最后通过数值仿真技术进一步验证影响决策行为的因素。结果发现：消费者的举报行为可以有效抑制电商平台“杀熟”定价和政府部门不履行监管行为倾向;提高成本参照点和降低效价参照点可以快速降低“杀熟”定价和不监管行为的发生;加大处罚力度、提高政府部门的提成系数可以有效降低电商平台“杀熟”定价倾向,激励政府部门向监管行为演化。

关键词: 前景理论, 心理账户, 行为监管, “杀熟”定价, 演化博弈