Abstract: When innovation is sequential, early innovators have the exclusive right to use their technology because of patent policy, so they may hold up the later ones. Under complete information, licensing before R&D may avoid holdup but fail under incomplete information. We provide a model when the development cost or value is private information, with which we analyze the innovators’ decision, give the conditions under which holdup occurs and its probability, and point out the optimal patent policy.

Key words: sequential innovation, holdup, optimal patent policy, social welfare

摘要： 在序贯创新中, 前期创新者因为专利政策的保护, 其技术的“专有性”可能会对后续创新者产生“钳制”(holdup)。信息对称下, 事前报价机制可以避免holdup问题, 但是信息不对称时, 事前报价机制可能失效。我们分析了在成本信息不对称和收益信息不对称这两种情况下的序贯创新的决策问题, 给出了holdup发生的条件和概率, 并且指出了社会福利最优下的专利政策函数。

关键词: 序贯创新, 钳制, 最优专利政策, 社会福利