Abstract: A model is built to analyze corporate environmental investment behavior based on the agent’s self-adaptive rules. In government environmental regulation and market volatility, the uncertainty of corporate environmental investment decision is depicted. The laws of corporate environmental investment behaviors are explored by the method of computational experiment under four scenarios including benchmark, fluctuation, rise and fall. Experiments results show that environmental regulation uncertainty is positively related to a firm’s environmental investment. The stronger the intensity of government regulation, the more fully firm’s environmental investment. However, we find the investment’ bias is more obvious. In the oscillating situation, the behavior of corporate environmental investment is not rational. In the rising situation, the corporate environmental investment is an overreaction. When commodity price fluctuates at one side, the government can use flexible environmental regulation to achieve goals. However, when the commodity price shocks, government will need to use more strict environmental regulation to stimulate enterprises to invest in environment. Finally, both the government environmental regulation and market signal affect the environmental investment behavior. The continuous stimulation of the government environmental regulation will not cause enterprises to make blinded investment, but the frequent change of environmental regulations will make enterprises have no idea about taking their action.

Key words: environmental regulation, market fluctuations, environmental investment, computational experiments, investment efficiency

摘要： 通过主体适应性规则构建企业环境投资行为模型,从政府环境规制和市场波动等方面刻画企业环境投资决策面临的不确定性,基于计算实验方法探寻企业在基准、震荡、上涨与下跌等4种情景下的环境投资行为规律。研究发现:政府规制强度越强,企业环境投资越充分,但投资偏差现象越明显。在震荡情景中,企业的环境投资行为表现出非理性状态,在上涨情景中,企业环境投资表现出过度反应。当市场产品价格波动处在单边行情,政府可以通过较为宽松的环境规制实现目标,而当市场产品价格处在震荡波动时,政府需要通过较为严格的环境规制刺激企业进行环境投资。企业的环境投资受到政府规制与市场信号的共同影响,政府的环境规制稳定的持续刺激并不会让企业盲目投资,但政府环境规制的频繁变动却会使企业无所适从。

关键词: 环境规制, 市场波动, 环境投资, 计算实验, 投资效率