Abstract: Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China explicitly proposed to actively develop the mixed ownership economy, the reform of mixed ownership has sped up and achieved remarkable results. As one of the approaches, the introduction of strategic investors has attracted widespread attention. From the perspective of existing research, insufficient attention has been paid to the interests of participants in the reform of mixed ownership, either ignoring the policy factors, resulting in a certain disconnect between theoretical research and practice, or considering the participants incompletely. In view of this, the paper focuses on the following issues: What are the behavioral logic and strategic choices of both sides of the game in the process? How do their strategic choices dynamic evolve under different policy incentives? Is there a heterogeneity? The study and discussion of the above issues help clarify the behavioral logic of participants, improve the effectiveness of introducing strategic investors and optimize policy supply. Compared with existing research, the possible contributions include: Firstly, in terms of research methods, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the strategic choices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and strategic investors, enriching and expanding the research on the strategic interactions of heterogeneous actors in the new round of mixed reform. Secondly, focusing on how policy incentives affect system evolution not only expands relevant research, but also provides a useful reference for optimizing policy supply.
This paper analyzes the strategic choice behavior of both sides in the process of introducing strategic investors into state-owned enterprises by constructing an evolutionary game model, and solves the stable equilibrium strategy. The strategic choice behavior of game players in different initial states and the dynamic evolution process affected by government incentive policies are simulated. The results show that the government incentive policy will affect the strategic choice of game participants.When the initial intention is at a low level, the probability of state-owned enterprises choosing to introduce strategies increases with the increase of government incentives. And the optimal strategy choice of strategic investors turns to “participation” when the initial intention is at a high level. When the initial intention of state-owned enterprises is high, the policy inclination has the promotion effect. Relatively the policy inclination slows down the convergence speed. When the initial intention is relatively high, the decline of the probability of government incentive policy supply may change the players’ optimal strategy choice fundamentally.
There is still room for further expansion in this study. For example, in the practice of mixed reform, there may be multiple strategic investors which are different in entry order, negotiation ability, and other aspects. In the future, we plan to explore the strategic interaction between state-owned enterprises and multiple strategic investors, in order to provide useful ideas for solving the problem of strategic investor selection; How to allocate the equity ratio of mixed ownership enterprises is a core issue, and heterogeneous equity allocation can be considered next.

Key words: state-owned enterprises, strategic investors, SOE mixed-ownership reform, evolutionary game

摘要： 构建演化博弈模型探究国有企业引入战略投资者过程中双方的行为逻辑和策略选择,求解稳定均衡策略,仿真模拟不同初始状态下博弈参与主体的策略选择及其受激励政策影响的动态演化过程。研究表明:政府激励政策会影响博弈双方的策略选择,且在不同初始状态下存在差异,当双方初始意愿较低时,国有企业选择引入策略的概率随激励力度增加而提升,初始意愿较高平时,战略投资者最优策略选择转为“参与”。国有企业初始意愿较高时,政策倾斜具有“锦上添花”的促进效应,初始意愿较低时,则减缓了其收敛速度;当双方初始意愿较高时,激励政策供给概率下降使参与主体的最优策略选择发生根本性变化。

关键词: 国有企业, 战略投资者, 混合所有制改革, 演化博弈