Abstract: As the mother river of the Chinese nation, the Yellow River Basin constitutes an important ecological barrier and is a key economic zone in our country. It is also a crucial region for building a beautiful China. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council attach great importance to the Yellow River issue and have elevated ecological protection and high-quality development of the Yellow River Basin to a major national strategy. How to carry out practical and effective environmental management actions in the Yellow River Basin, and coordinate the increasingly complex functional conflicts and the contradictions of multiple interest demands, have become urgent problems that need to be addressed.
From the perspective of evolutionary game, this paper introduces the inspection intensity into the strategy choice of local governments. It constructs two scenarios without and with central government constraints, analyzes the dynamic evolutionary game of local governments, enterprises and the public in these two scenarios in the Yellow River Basin, and explores the behavior and strategy choice of the game players through numerical simulation. The paper reveals the key factors that influence the governance of the ecological environment in the basin.
The results show that: Firstly, when the parameter values are determined, the strategy evolution speed of local governments, enterprises and the public in the Yellow River Basin will be affected by the strategy selection probability of themselves and other two parties. However, no matter how the value of each agent's choice probability changes, it will not alter the final behavior strategy choice of the game agent, and will eventually reach the stable strategy points under different stability conditions. Secondly, under the constraints of the central government, the tripartite game players can achieve the ideal evolutionary stable equilibrium (strict supervision, water saving and emission reduction, supervision). Thirdly, compared with the scenario without central government constraints, the constraints of the central government can accelerate the evolution of local governments, enterprises and the public to strict supervision, water conservation and emission reduction, and supervision under the corresponding stable conditions. This indicates that the central government's constraints promote the game players to choose the strategy of actively managing the basin environment. Based on the above research conclusions, the following suggestions are proposed: Firstly, the central government should increase the rewards and punishments, and formulate reasonable policies to strengthen the supervision and intervention in the environmental governance of the Yellow River Basin by local governments. Secondly, the central government should strengthen the environmental responsibility of local governments. Local governments should establish reasonable water resource tax rates and environmental regulatory standards, increase rewards and punishments for water conservation and emission reduction enterprises, and encourage enterprises to actively conserve water and reduce emissions. Thirdly, Local governments should implement the corporate responsibility for pollution control. Enterprises should enhance their environmental awareness, actively engage in technological innovation, and seek new development paths for water conservation and emission reduction. Fourthly, the governments should improve the mechanism for public participation and supervision. We should utilize media and reporting mechanisms to supervise enterprises, and make reasonable use of rewards provided by the central and local governments for reporting, in order to participate in environmental governance in an orderly manner.

Key words: Yellow River Basin, environmental governance, evolutionary game

摘要： 文章从演化博弈视角出发,构建无中央政府约束和有中央政府约束两种情景,分析黄河流域地方政府、企业和公众在两种情景中的环境治理行为选择,并通过数值仿真探究三方博弈主体的演化策略。结果表明:一是在参数取值确定的情况下,地方政府、企业和公众的策略演化速度会受到自身和其他两方主体策略选择概率的影响,但无论各主体选择概率的取值如何变化,都不会改变博弈主体的最终行为策略选择,最终都会达到不同稳定性条件下的稳定策略点。二是在有中央政府的约束下,三方博弈主体能够达到(严格督查,达标排放,监督)的理想演化稳定均衡。三是相较于无中央政府约束的情景,中央政府约束可促使黄河流域地方政府、企业和公众演化至严格督查、达标排放、监督的速度变快。

关键词: 黄河流域, 环境治理, 演化博弈