Abstract: With the continuous improvement of the level of global industrialization, the large amount of greenhouse gas emissions has led to an increasingly prominent climate problem. Facing a severe environmental pressure, on the one hand, the national carbon emission trading market has been officially launched, which combines low-carbon compensation and high-emission constraints. On the other hand, the improvement of environmental protection awareness makes consumers more inclined to low-carbon consumption, which provides impetus for the generation of low-carbon operation models of supply chain production and sales enterprises. However, the benefits and costs of carbon emission reduction in the supply chain are difficult to match, and the existence of positive external effects further hinders the smooth implementation of low-carbon supply chains. Therefore, how to use the government’s environmental regulation measures to encourage sellers and manufacturers to interact and restrict each other through the carbon trading market and product market is the key to exploring the stable development of low-carbon supply chains in the context of consumers’ low-carbon preferences.
Based on the fact that the conditions of complete rationality and complete information of traditional game participants are difficult to meet, the evolutionary game theory, which is assumed to be more realistic, is used by more and more scholars to analyze the carbon emission reduction behavior of supply chain member companies under the carbon trading mechanism. Based on the bounded rationality assumption of the game subject, this paper accurately describes the behavior of the participating players by setting different parameters, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the government, retailers and manufacturers, and obtains a replicative dynamic system. This paper first analyzes the strategic stability of a single player with the stability principle of differential equations to study the relationship between the strategic choice of a single player and the decisions and parameter changes of other players, and then uses evolutionary game theory to conduct a holistic analysis of the three-party evolutionary game system. Finally, the interaction mechanism of game players and the influencing factors of low-carbon production and marketing mode are further explored with the help of MATLAB numerical simulation in order to find the optimal game equilibrium strategy and evolution path.
This paper draws the following conclusions: (1)During the operation of the national carbon trading market, achieving the stable development of low-carbon supply chain is the result of multi-stakeholder game interaction. (2)Carbon trading policies can effectively improve the enthusiasm of retailers and manufacturers to form a combination of low-carbon production and marketing strategies. When the policy incentive effect is limited, the government will need to improve the intensity of low-carbon subsidies and penalties to ensure certain environmental regulation effects. (3)When the probability of carbon theft of traditional manufacturers increases, the incentive effect of carbon trading policy on low-carbon transformation will be weakened, but the policy effect of punishment regulation will be strengthened. (4)Consumers’ low-carbon preference is mainly reflected in the impact of carbon emission reduction level and promotion level of low-carbon products on demand. The increased market demand will promote supply chain members to make low-carbon decisions. Based on the above conclusions, the following suggestions are obtained: (1)The government should maintain and gradually improve the national carbon trading market through various measures, and give full play to the important role of carbon trading policies in guiding the stable development of low-carbon supply chains. (2)When carbon trading and government environmental regulation are in parallel, regulatory decision-making should do a good job of supporting carbon trading policies. For supply chain companies that actively participate in low-carbon production and sales, the government should reduce their low-carbon costs through various forms of support. For companies that insist on traditional production or even carbon stealth emissions, the government should deter their luck by severely punishing them. (3)The government and enterprises should strive to guide consumers’ low-carbon awareness, create an environment conducive to low-carbon consumption, and finally realize the ideal scenario of the carbon trading market and the product market jointly promoting the low-carbon production and marketing of the supply chain from the perspective of government environmental regulation.

Key words: carbon trading, market regulation, low-carbon supply chain, evolutionary game

摘要： 考虑消费者低碳偏好,研究在碳交易政策下如何有效对二级供应链中的零售商与制造商实施环境规制策略。本文构建了由政府、零售商和制造商组成的低碳产销系统演化博弈模型,探索了三方主体的策略稳定性、影响机制及演化路径。研究发现:零售商与制造商选择低碳产销策略组合的意愿会随着碳交易价格的升高而增强;前期,碳交易政策发挥作用有限,政府的低碳补贴、偷排惩罚可以引导零售商、制造商的生产经营行为;后期,政府在正、负两个方向上的激励减弱,由消费者低碳偏好决定的低碳产销敏感系数成为推动低碳供应链稳定发展的重要因素。

关键词: 碳交易, 环境规制, 低碳供应链, 演化博弈