Abstract: The soul of high-tech zone is innovation and development. Meanwhile, high-tech zone is also the result of industrial spatial agglomeration of high-tech enterprises. The development of national high-tech zones will produce agglomeration effect, siphon effect and technological innovation effect on the high-tech industry, and in turn, the high-tech industry will affect the development of national high-tech zones through policy effect, human capital, science and technology. The action and reaction between the two can be expressed as the ability and degree of their collaborative development. In the process of rapid and high-speed development, the mutual influence and interaction between the two cannot be separated from the participation of the core subject high-tech enterprises and academic and research institutions. The joint development of national high-tech zones and high-tech industries is essentially an operation mode of innovation chain, and the operation of innovation chain cannot be separated from the dynamic game between participants. From the perspective of collaboration, the coupling of the two subsystems requires the cooperation of different participants, and whether it is a national high-tech zone or a high-tech industry, the participants are all stakeholders. When making coupled cooperative decision, the decision-making subject will consider the influence of other subject’s decision and the cost and benefit of coupling cooperation. The action process of national high-tech zones and high-tech industries is to participate in the inter-subject game process. The win-win situation and information in coupling coordination are not fully in line with the cooperation and uncertainty of the game. The behavior strategies of participants will influence each other, and the cooperation also has the characteristics of dynamic repetition. Participants make judgment according to cost and benefit in the process of coordination. From the perspective of coupling mechanism, how the core players involved in the collaborative development of national high-tech zones and high-tech industries carry out game evolution, and how to construct the selection strategy that fits the tacit understanding mechanism of the core players based on different scenarios are the core of this paper.
Depending on the coupling mechanism and under the premise of incomplete rationality, the strategies adopted by the two types of subjects can be divided into “cooperation” and “non-cooperation”. The cooperation and income of subjects under different market and government supervision mechanisms are evaluated, and its value coordination mechanism is determined in the form of contract. Due to the limited rationality and the incompleteness of contract, the cooperative cooperation between the two subjects has certain moral hazard. The evolutionary game method is widely used in the study of the dynamic process evolution of the system, and the two sides achieve a higher level of interaction, trial and error and coupling between the high-tech zone and high-tech industry through collaborative cooperation. Therefore, the coupling coordination between high-tech enterprises and research institutions is the key to studying this problem. Based on the above research objectives, this paper carries out a systematic analysis of the player’s strategy selection along the path of “basic hypothesis - different mechanism model construction - numerical analysis - random disturbance analysis”. In the conventional evolutionary game, the player’s strategy has an important impact on whether the national high-tech zone and high-tech industry can achieve a high level of coupling and collaborative development, and the player’s evolution strategy is different under different mechanisms. However, the player’s state and other factors may affect the player’s strategy choice, so it is necessary and practical to construct a stochastic evolutionary model to test the influence of uncertain factors on the evolutionary system.
The evolutionary game model is introduced into the coupling framework of the two subsystems, and the coupling coordination interest relationship of the two sub-systems is constructed from the two aspects of market mechanism and government regulation. The system stability conditions and equilibrium points are obtained by evolutionary game method, and the evolutionary stability of the factors affecting the coupling coordination dynamics of the main body under the two mechanisms is analyzed by simulation. Random interference factors are introduced to analyze the influence of game system. The results show that under the market mechanism, the benefit distribution ratio, cost allocation ratio, risk factor size and penalty for breach of contract have obvious effects on high-tech enterprises and institutions to support the coupling coordination activities of the two subsystems, but the mechanism is different. Under the supervision of the government, the behaviors of the game parties change with the change of regulation intensity. In addition to the income distribution coefficient, risk coefficient, cost allocation ratio and penalty damages, the government’s incentive, subsidy factor and tax reduction and exemption intensity of the coupling coordination mechanism will have an impact on the evolutionary game system. Considering random interference factors, random interference factors will slow down the speed of high-tech enterprises and institutions to evolve into stable strategies.

Key words: national high-tech zone, high-tech industry, coupling synergy, evolutionary game

摘要： 将演化博弈模型引入到两子系统耦合框架下,从市场机制与政府调控两方面构建两子系耦合协调利益关系,采用演化博弈方法求得系统稳定条件与均衡点,并通过仿真分析两种机制下影响主体耦合协同动力因素的演化稳定性,并引入随机干扰因素对博弈系统影响进行深入分析。结果表明,在市场机制下双方利益分配的比例、成本分摊比例、风险因子的大小、违约的惩罚力度对高新技术企业和学研机构支持两子系统耦合协调活动的效果明显,但作用机制不同;在政府监管下博弈双方的行为随着规制强度的改变而相应变动,除收益分配系数、风险系数、成本分摊比例、违约金外,政府对耦合协调机制的奖励、补贴因子、税费减免实施力度都会对演化博弈系统产生影响;考虑随机干扰因素后,随机干扰会减缓高新技术企业和学研机构演化至稳定策略的速度。

关键词: 国家高新区, 高新技术产业, 耦合协同, 演化博弈