Abstract: This paper investigates abatement R&D subsidy in a mixed duopoly with spillovers. The results show that as spillovers rate increases, the level of abatement R&D and pollution will decline. When the efficiency of emission abatement R&D is low, as the technology spillovers rate increases, the optimal subsidy will increase; when the efficiency of emission abatement R&D is high, as the technology spillovers rate increases, the optimal subsidy will decline. Subsidy policy cannot solve the inefficiency problem caused by the difference in output in the mixed market, but has better emission reduction and profit effects. Privatisation leads to an increase in profits and social welfare levels and a reduction in emissions and output.

Key words: privatization, technology spillovers effect, abatement R&D subsidy

摘要： 通过构建两阶段异质产品减排博弈模型,文章研究了混合所有制改革背景下最优的企业减排研发投资及研发补贴政策,并进一步讨论了最优减排研发补贴政策下政府实施国企混合所有制改革的环境和经济效果。结论表明:政府应主动实施减排研发补贴政策,最优减排研发补贴受技术溢出率、产品差异程度以及混合所有制改革程度的影响。当减排研发效率较低时,随着技术溢出率增大,最优的减排研发补贴水平不断提高,当减排研发效率较高时,随着技术溢出率增大,最优的减排研发补贴水平不断下降;随着产品差异化程度提高,最优减排研发补贴水平不断提高;混合所有制改革程度加深将使得最优减排研发补贴水平下降。最优减排研发补贴政策下,政府实施国企混合所有制改革能够降低整个行业的污染排放、提高行业的利润和社会福利水平,从而能够取得经济和环境的双赢。最后,结合相关结论,本文给出了混合所有制改革背景下减排研发补贴政策设计的相关建议,为政府决策提供一定参考。

关键词: 混合所有制改革, 技术溢出效应, 减排研发补贴