Abstract: Nowadays, online social network has become the main channel of rumor spread. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper takes rumor spreaders and rumor receivers as game participants, takes the different behavior choices of the above two types of users when facing rumors as different strategies in the game, and takes the profit function of the two types of users when choosing different strategies as the utility function of the game to analyze the rumor spreading process in the social network. This paper holds that there are three influencing factors affecting the utility function of game participants in rumor spread, namely, the self-knowledge reserve, reputation and influence of the participants in rumor spread. Whether the rumor spreader chooses to participate in the spreading or not, and whether the receiver chooses different strategies to comment on the spreader' s informa-tion, will affect three independent variables and further affect the participants themselves'revenue function. The results show that when the proportion of knowledge reserve in the network is large, rumor dissemination will be inhibited. When rumor participants pay more attention to their own influence, it will be conducive to rumor dissemination. This study will help us to understand the internal mechanism of rumor spreading on social networks more deeply, and then provide a strong theoretical basis for curbing rumor spread.

Key words: rumor, spreading behavior, online social network, evolutionary game theory

摘要： 目前,在线社会网络已经成为谣言传播的主要渠道。为此,本文基于演化博弈理论,以在线社会网络中的谣言传播者和谣言接收者作为博弈参与者;以上述两类用户在面对要谣言时不同的行为选择,作为博弈时的不同策略;并以二者在选择不同策略时收益的改变作为博弈的收益函数,对谣言的传播过程进行分析。本文认为谣言传播参与者的自我知识储备、声誉以及影响力等三种影响因子会影响博弈参与者的收益函数,而谣言传播者选择是否参与传播,谣言接收者选择是否对传播者信息进行评论的不同行动策略,将影响以上三个自变量,并进一步影响参与者自身的收益函数。结果表明：当网络中知识储备占比较大时,对谣言传播有抑制作用,当谣言参与者更注重自身影响力时,将有利于谣言的传播。本文的研究结论有助于深入了解在线社会网络谣言传播的内在机理,从而为遏制谣言扩散提供有力的理论依据。

关键词: 谣言, 传播行为, 在线社会网络, 演化博弈