Abstract: Government subsidy is of great importance for the R&D activities of new energy vehicle enterprises. Considering the R&D success rate, expected rate of return and innovation milieu, an evolutionary game model is adopted to explore the impact of government subsidy on the R&D activities of new energy vehicle enterprises. The results indicate that government subsidy may promote the self-R&D efforts of new energy vehicle enterprises while exceeding the threshold, and promote the technical import while descending below the threshold. Higher success rate of R&D activities will promote the self-R&D efforts of new energy vehicle enterprises. With the high success rate of R&D activities,a favorable environment for innovation may promote the self-R&D efforts of new energy vehicle enterprises, while unfavorable environment may promote the technical import. Policy implications are provided on the optimization of government subsidy, the promotion of R&D success rate and the favorable innovation milieu.

Key words: government subsidy, new energy vehicle, enterprises' R&D efforts, evolutionary game

摘要： 在新能源汽车产业发展初期,政府补贴是影响新能源汽车企业研发的关键变量。考虑新能源汽车企业研发成功率、预期收益率等内在因素,以及创新收益保障等外部环境的影响,本文通过构建演化博弈模型,研究政府补贴对新能源汽车企业自主研发和技术引进策略的影响。研究结果表明：政府补贴高于临界值时会促进新能源汽车企业自主研发,低于临界值时则会促进新能源汽车企业技术引进;较高的研发成功率会促进新能源汽车企业自主研发,反之会促进技术引进。在研发成功率比较高的情况下,良好的创新环境会促进新能源汽车企业自主研发,反之会促进新能源汽车企业技术引进。最后,从优化政府补贴、提高企业研发成功率和营造良好的外部环境视角提出了建议。

关键词: 政府补贴, 新能源汽车, 企业研发, 演化博弈