Abstract: In the era of the new knowledge economy, knowledge workers who have received higher education, had rich experience and relied mainly on mental labor, are the main force of enterprise innovation. However, the frequent turnover of knowledge workers will continuously weaken the core competitiveness of the enterprise, which makes the enterprise suffer greatly. The turnover behaviors of knowledge workers are affected by many factors. For example, a single incentive approach, such as the optimization of leadership style or salary increase retention, has shown many shortcomings in meeting the needs of knowledge workers. Knowledge governance, as a diversified combination of governance measures adopted by enterprises under specific circumstances, can satisfy the three core needs of survival, mutual relationship and growth of knowledge workers. Therefore, our research starts from the core needs of knowledge workers, embeds ERG theory into the turnover game model, discusses the root governance of knowledge governance on knowledge workers’ turnover behavior, and reveals the effective incentive mechanism for knowledge workers to remain. At the same time, the existing turnover game model is expanded to reveal the mechanism of the interaction between knowledge governance input strategy choice and knowledge workers’ turnover behavior decision, and the research results provide enlightenment for enterprises’ governance of knowledge workers’ turnover behavior.
Based on evolutionary game theory, ERG theory and knowledge governance theory, our research constructs an evolutionary game model of enterprise knowledge governance input and turnover behavior of knowledge workers, and carries out model derivation and stability analysis to analyze the strategic choices of enterprises and knowledge workers under different labor market supply and demand conditions. Meanwhile, with the help of Anylogic7.0.2, the system dynamics simulation model of the game between enterprise knowledge governance input and knowledge workers’ turnover behavior is constructed, and the sensitivity of the main parameters under the stable equilibrium point to the system evolution is simulated and analyzed.
Our research results show that when supply exceeds demand in the labor market, the high input income of enterprise knowledge governance is greater than the low input income of that, and the ESS(evolutionarily stable strategy) is the high input of enterprise knowledge governance and the non turnover of knowledge workers. Simultaneously, when workers do not leave the enterprise under low input of knowledge governance, the greater the enterprise’s income, the more seriously the enterprise will consider whether to increase the input of knowledge governance, so that the rate of tending to the high input is relatively slow, and most workers will choose not to leave the enterprise quickly. With high input of knowledge governance, the higher the income of the enterprise when the workers do not quit, the more quickly the enterprise will choose the high input of knowledge governance, so that the rate of tending to the high input is relatively fast, and the probability of not leaving of the workers who are motivated by the high input also rises. When the labor market is in short supply, the low input income of enterprise knowledge governance is greater, and the ESS is the low input of enterprise knowledge governance and the turnover of knowledge workers. In the meantime, whether it is low or high input in knowledge governance, the greater the return on workers’ growth needs when they do not leave, the slower the overall probability of low input in knowledge governance rises, and the slower the probability of knowledge workers who do not quit falls. The higher the cost of meeting workers’ growth needs under high input of knowledge governance, the faster the probability of low input of knowledge governance tends to be one, and the probability of knowledge workers who do not leave also tends to be zero faster. When the enterprise income of workers who do not resign under low input of knowledge governance is less than thirty, the probability of low input of knowledge governance will first decline and then rise to one. When the enterprise income of workers who do not resign under low input of knowledge governance is greater than thirty, the probability of low input of knowledge governance will continue to rise. When the enterprise income of workers who do not resign under high input of knowledge governance is greater than one hundred, the probability of low input of knowledge governance will first decline and then rise to one.
Finally, in order to further investigate, future research can consider both the overall needs of knowledge workers and the different needs of diversified knowledge workers, such as the differences in the needs of research and development personnel and management personnel, so as to conduct differentiated research on the governance of turnover behavior problems for different categories of knowledge workers. In addition, we can not only explore how enterprises can reasonably meet the needs of knowledge workers through knowledge governance input, thus achieving the governance of workers’ turnover behavior problems, but also study the impact of their own attitudes on demand satisfaction from the perspective of workers’ personality traits. For example, from the perspective of positive organizational behavior, we can further explore the governance of knowledge workers’ turnover behavior problems.

Key words: knowledge governance, knowledge worker turnover, ERG theory, game analysis, system dynamics

摘要： 知识型员工离职行为受多因素影响,单一的激励方式在满足员工需求上已展现出很多不足,而知识治理则可以实现知识型员工生存、相互关系和成长三个核心需求的满足。本研究基于ERG理论和知识治理理论,构建博弈模型,分析在不同的劳动力市场供求状况下企业与知识型员工的策略选择。系统动力学仿真发现,劳动力市场供大于求时,企业知识治理高投入收益大于知识治理低投入收益,ESS(演化稳定策略)为企业知识治理高投入和知识型员工不离职;劳动力市场供不应求时,企业知识治理低投入收益更高,ESS为企业知识治理低投入和知识型员工离职。最后,仿真分析主要参数对系统演化的敏感性,为企业治理知识型员工离职问题提供启示。

关键词: 知识治理, 知识型员工离职, ERG理论, 博弈分析, 系统动力学