Abstract: The platform business model, characterized by digitalization, intelligence and networking, has given rise to a large number of online gig workers, such as online delivery workers, online car drivers and chauffeurs, etc. However, their labor rights and interests are not well protected due to the separation from the traditional “employer+employee” model. This paper tries to take the cooperative employment model of take-away delivery riders as an example and conducts a study of how the government can effectively participate in governing the rights and interests of online gig workers on platforms. The exploration of this issue not only helps to clarify the role of government in the process of platform economy governance, but also helps to provide theoretical reference for the governance practice of government departments to “classify and regulate platforms”. Game theory is an important theoretical tool for coordinating various stakeholders and forming a win-win situation for all parties. Therefore, this paper explores the effectiveness of different ways of local governments’ participation in the governance of the problem of gig workers’ rights and interests in the platform with the help of game model.
Several conclusions are drawn from the study. First, in the inclusive platform autonomy model of local governments, even if local governments stipulate the standards of responsibility, there are still problems with insufficient supervision of platforms and weak performance of responsibility by partners, which precisely shows that it is difficult to achieve the governance effect by platform self-regulation alone and the government needs to play the role of external governance.Second, in the prudent direct governance model of local governments, considering the rational value pursuit of local governments, there is an appropriate responsibility standard, which can motivate the local government to expand the scope of regulation and increase the intensity of regulation.Finally, in the local government cooperative collaborative governance model, local governments’ regulation and platform’s regulation complement with each other, and the platform’s regulation is motivated by the dual reinforcement of governments’ regulation intensity and joint liability. Furthermore, through the comparison of three government governance participation models, it is found that even if the government sets the standards of responsibility for gig workers’ rights and interests, its external supervision is still indispensable, and the introduction of joint liability mechanism can effectively avoid the insufficient motivation of platform’s regulation, and the formed collaborative governance pattern of local government and platform can realize the Pareto optimum of gig workers’ rights and interests. That is to say, the cooperative collaborative governance model is the most effective in guaranteeing online gig workers’ rights and interests.
In the future, further research can be considered from the following aspects: (1)Unlike the online service platforms, the labor rights and interests of takeaway riders, errand workers and proxy drivers are more reflected in labor accidents. In content sharing platforms, the labor rights and interests of gig workers such as video bloggers are reflected in the protection of intellectual property rights. Therefore, subsequent studies can be conducted on the governance strategies of various subjects under different demands for gig rights and interests. (2)In the whole platform service supply chain, consumers are an important part, which not only directly affects the decision-making of platforms, but also may have an impact on the choice of government regulation methods. Therefore, we can consider incorporating consumer feedback into the model to analyze the governance strategy of gig workers’ rights protection in the context of the platform chain.

Key words: government regulation; participation mode; platform gig workers; labor rights and interests; cooperative labor

摘要： 平台零工权益保障事关共同富裕大计,是政府治理平台经济的重要内容。“强监管”政策下,以合作用工模式为例,借助动态博弈模型对比三种政府参与模式(包容式平台自治、审慎式直接治理与合作式协同共治)对平台及其合作商保障零工权益行为的影响。研究发现:政府包容式平台自治模式往往导致平台监管动力不足,需要引入政府审慎式直接治理,但存在一个零工权益责任标准的最高阈值,该值取决于劳动市场供给、网络订单收益率、平台规模等;在阈值内,政府可以引入连带问责机制提高平台自治的积极性,此时政府合作式协同治理模式成为最有效的保障策略。一方面尝试回答现阶段平台治理中政府角色转型争议,另一方面也为政府规制模式的选择提供参考。

关键词: 政府规制, 参与方式, 平台零工, 劳动权益, 合作用工