Research on Coordination Problem of Assembly System with Asymmetric Supplier’s Cost Information

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0033

Abstract

Abstract: We take an assembly system consisting of two suppliers and one manufacturer as the research object, wherein one of the suppliers has private cost information, and the manufacturer reveals this private information through designing contract. As the channel master in the assembly system, the manufacturer aims to maximize its profit on the one hand, and on the other hand, it looks forward to gain more profit through channel coordination. The result shows that when the manufacturer offers wholesale price contracts to both the two suppliers, it is unable to reveal the true cost information; when the manufacturer offers a markdown money contract to the supplier with private cost information, and offers a wholesale price contract to the other supplier, it is able to reveal the true cost information, but can’t realize channel coordination; when the manufacturer offers markdown money contracts to both the two suppliers, it is able to reveal the true cost information while ensuring the channel is coordinated. We find from the numerical study that when the manufacturer offers markdown money contracts to both the two suppliers, the channel profit increases, and the feasible region of private information becomes larger, but the manufacturer’s profit may decrease.

Key words: asymmetric cost information, assembly system, wholesale price, markdown money, coordination

摘要： 本文研究的装配系统由两个供应商和一个制造商组成,其中一个供应商的成本信息为公共信息,另一个供应商的成本信息为其私有信息,制造商通过设计契约来揭示该私有信息。作为装配系统的主导者,制造商一方面以自身利润最大化为目标,另一方面希望通过系统协同来获得更多的利润。研究结果表明,制造商对两个供应商都采用批发价契约时,无法揭示供应商的私有信息;制造商对信息公开的供应商采用批发价契约,对拥有私有信息的供应商采用价格补贴契约时,可以揭示供应商的私有信息,但不能实现装配系统的整体协同;制造商对两个供应商都采用价格补贴契约时,在成功揭示供应商的私有信息的同时,也实现了装配系统的整体协同。数值分析结果表明,同制造商对两个供应商分别提供批发价契约和价格补贴契约时相比,制造商对两个供应商都提供价格补贴契约时,私有信息的揭示区间会变大,系统总利润和拥有私有信息的供应商的利润会增加,信息公开的供应商的利润会降低,制造商的利润可能增加也可能降低。

关键词: 成本信息不对称, 装配系统, 批发价, 补贴, 协同

CLC Number:

F273

LV Fei, MA Shi-hua. Research on Coordination Problem of Assembly System with Asymmetric Supplier’s Cost Information[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(2): 57-67.

吕飞, 马士华. 供应商成本信息不对称下装配系统协同问题研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(2): 57-67.

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