Effects of Manufacturer’s Scale Diseconomies on Launching Direct Channel

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0034

Abstract

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of manufacturer’s scale diseconomies on the choice of the manufacturer launching online direct channel. In the symmetric-information framework, the manufacturer’s scale diseconomies Bertrand models are proposed between single-channel and dual-channel supply chains. The optimal prices and profits are compared between single-channel and dual-channel supply chains of Stackelberg competition. This paper demonstrates three interesting results: (i)when the retailer has less market shares and the manufacturer’s production exhibits its low diseconomies of scale, the manufacturersr decides to launch online direct channel in order to increase profits. (ⅱ)if the retailer has less market shares but the manufacturer’s production exhibits its high diseconomies of scale, the manufacturer declines to launch online direct channel. (ⅲ)only if the retailer has more market shares, the manufacturer declines to launch online direct channel. In addition, the retailer’s profit always decreases while the manufacturer launches online direct channel.

Key words: supply chain, online direct channel, bertrand game, diseconomies

摘要： 研究了规模不经济对制造商直销渠道选择的影响。运用博弈论建立了单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,得到了Bertrand均衡的渠道价格以及制造商和零售商最优利润。研究发现当零售商潜在市场份额较小时,若制造商规模不经济不明显,制造商开通直销渠道;若制造商规模不经济明显,制造商不开通直销渠道。当零售商潜在市场份额较大时,制造商不开通直销渠道。此外,直销渠道总是侵蚀零售商利润。

关键词: 供应链, 直销渠道, 主从博弈, 规模不经济

CLC Number:

F274
F406.1

NIE Jia-jia, SHI Chun-lai. Effects of Manufacturer’s Scale Diseconomies on Launching Direct Channel[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(2): 68-75.

聂佳佳, 石纯来. 规模不经济对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(2): 68-75.

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