Abstract: Aiming at solving the problems of prevention and incentive of service providers’ moral hazard in R & D outsourcing, the paper designs R & D outsourcing payment contract and analyzes the characteristics of the contract considering the service provider’s own capital restrictions. The research shows that how much their own funds the service providers have will affect the incentive effect of the payment contract. When service providers rarely have their own funds, the payment contract has a poor effect on the prevention and incentive for moral hazard. When the service providers’ own capital reaches a certain amount, with the increase of their own funds, the incentive effect of the payment contract is stronger, and especially when the service providers’ own funds reaches a large amount, the payment contract can encourage the service providers to make their effort to achieve the optimal system.

Key words: R&, D outsourcing, moral hazard, capital restrictions, payment contract

摘要： 针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商自有资金限制下,设计了研发外包支付契约,分析了契约的特性。研究表明,服务商自有资金的多少会影响支付契约的激励效果。当服务商自有资金很少时,支付契约对道德风险的防范与激励效果较差。当服务商自有资金达到一定量时,随着自有资金的增多,支付契约的激励效果越来越强,特别的当服务商自有资金超过很大一个量时,支付契约能激励服务商实现系统最优的工作努力程度。

关键词: 研发外包, 道德风险, 资金限制, 支付契约