Abstract: Under the background of Chinese fiscal decentralization, the implementation of local government environmental regulation is studied in the case of pollution charge. The binding character of regulation is described by dynamic game analysis between local government and enterprise. The equilibrium model of regulation implementation is established based on the Peltzman model, and the formation mechanism of equilibrium is discussed. The influence of institutional factors, the environmental regulation policy, the cost and technology of pollution control to the regulation implementation are analyzed based on the equilibrium model. The results show that local government will maximize his utility by adjusting the intensity of regulation implementation, so as to achieve the state of equilibrium. The indifference curve and the equilibrium of regulation implementation are affected by the institutional factors of Chinese fiscal decentralization. Although more stringent environmental regulation policy is formulated by the central government can improve investment of pollution control in theory, which will be harmful to the implementation of local government environmental regulation. The implementation of environmental regulation will be promoted by reducing cost of pollution control, but the influence of pollution control technology to the implementation of environmental regulation will be different under different conditions.

Key words: environmental regulation, local government, equilibrium analysis, fiscal decentralization

摘要： 在中国式分权的制度背景下,以排污收费为例,对地方政府环境规制执行问题进行研究。通过建立地方政府与企业的动态博弈模型,刻画了环境规制的约束性本质特征。以此为基础,通过对政府规制利益集团理论Peltzman模型进行修正和拓展,构建了地方政府的环境规制执行均衡模型,阐述了环境规制执行均衡的形成机制。基于环境规制执行均衡模型,分析了制度因素、环境规制政策标准、治污成本和污染削减技术对地方政府环境规制执行的影响。研究结果表明,地方政府通过调节环境规制执行强度实现自身效用的最大化,从而达到环境规制执行的均衡状态。中央政府制定的更为严格的环境规制政策标准尽管在理论上能够提高企业的治污投入,但却有可能对地方政府的环境规制执行产生负面影响。降低企业治污成本能够促进地方政府严格执行环境规制,而污染削减技术创新则会在不同条件下对地方政府的环境规制执行产生不同的影响。

关键词: 环境规制, 地方政府, 均衡分析, 财政分权