电信运营商双寡头定价机制设计

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0102

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (5): 6-13.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0102

电信运营商双寡头定价机制设计

张雪峰¹, 梁湧², 马潇宇³

1.北方工业大学经济管理学院,北京 100144;
2.清华大学经济管理学院,北京 100084;
3.北京外国语大学国际商学院,北京 100089

收稿日期:2016-11-16 出版日期:2017-05-25
通讯作者: 马潇宇(1987-),女,山西孝义人,博士,讲师,研究方向:收益管理、供应链协调。
作者简介:张雪峰(1981-),男,四川万源人,博士,讲师,研究方向:博弈论与机制设计;梁湧(1983-),男,北京人,博士,讲师,研究方向:管理科学与工程
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602011);北京市优秀人才青年骨干项目(2016000020124G021);北京外国语大学基本科研业务费项目

Optimal Pricing Mechanisms for Mobile Service Providers Under Duopoly Competition

ZHANG Xue-feng¹, LIANG Yong², MA Xiao-yu³

1. School of Economics and Management, North China University of Technology, Beijing 10144, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;
3. International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing 100089, China

Received:2016-11-16 Online:2017-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 电信市场存在运营商之间的竞争关系,运营商针对异质性消费者的定价机制设计更是直接影响其利润的实现,本文利用机制设计方法,分析了电信运营商的双寡头垄断定价策略,研究发现:(1)运营商的核心利润来源于低类型消费者的总剩余。低类型消费者的消费扭曲来源于运营商提供给高类型消费者过高的信息成本。要想改善低类型消费者的不满和消费扭曲,需要降低对高类型消费者的优惠幅度。(2)电信运营商的最优定价随竞争对手的价格同向变动。(3)电信运营商最优定价与消费者对该运营商的服务体验成正比,与消费者对竞争对手运营商的服务体验成反比。所以,运营商应当不断优化自己网络的服务质量,提高消费者的服务体验,进而才能有涨价的空间。

关键词: 电信运营商, 异质性, 定价策略, 机制设计

Abstract: Due to competition in the wireless communication market, the pricing mechanisms of mobile service providers determine their profit. In this paper, we use mechanism design to analyze the optimal pricing strategies for service providers towards heterogeneous consumers under duopoly competition. The major findings are threefold: (1)the majority of the profit of service providers comes from low type consumers, and there exist usage distortion of low type consumers roots from the information rent that service providers give to high type consumers. Therefore, service providers should lower the preferential margins to high type consumers to stimulate the consumption of low type consumers; (2)the optimal pricing menu offered by a service provider is positively correlated with that of her competitor; and (3)the optimal pricing menu of a service provider is positively correlated with her service level, and negatively correlated with the service level of her competitor. In other words, besides offering competitive pricing, service providers should constantly improve their service level in order to create higher profit.

Key words: mobile service providers, heterogeneous consumers, pricing strategies, mechanism design#

中图分类号:

F626

张雪峰, 梁湧, 马潇宇. 电信运营商双寡头定价机制设计[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(5): 6-13.

ZHANG Xue-feng, LIANG Yong, MA Xiao-yu. Optimal Pricing Mechanisms for Mobile Service Providers Under Duopoly Competition[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(5): 6-13.

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电信运营商双寡头定价机制设计

Optimal Pricing Mechanisms for Mobile Service Providers Under Duopoly Competition

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