关键词: 策略型消费者, 定价策略, 斯坦伯格博弈, 麻烦成本, 折扣销售期

Abstract: The dual discount phenomenon of e-commerce platform has aroused huge consumer demand. This paper develops a stackelberg game model of e-commerce platform and merchant with discount sales period. It studies the optimal pricing strategy for merchant and e-commerce platform with consumer rebate when the e-commerce platform does not provide consumer rebate and provide consumer rebate. From the perspective of consumers, this paper combines the optimization method and game theory, and tries to provide recommendation for the decision-making of merchant and e-commerce platform. The results show that: (1)When the e-commerce platform does not provide rebate, the higher the strategic degree of consumers, the higher the price in normal sales period, the lower the discount rate. (2)When the e-commerce platform provides consumers with rebate, the price in normal sales period will increase, while the price in discount period will decrease. The phenomenon of differential pricing is more obvious. (3)When the hassle cost of the consumer is higher than a certain threshold, the e-commerce platform provides higher rebate. In addition, the customer rebate and the optimal profit of merchant and e-commerce platform increase as the hassle cost of the consumer. (4)In the extension part, this paper considers thereaction of too high hassle cost to the user demand, and finds that properly increasing the hassle cost of consumers can increase the income of the e-commerce platform and merchant, but when it exceeds a certain range, it will cause loss of customers and damage the profits of both sides.

Key words: strategic consumers, pricing strategy, Stackelberg game, hassle cost, discount selling period