关键词: 信息不对称, 主导结构, 碳减排, 信号博弈, 均衡策略

Abstract: Carbon emission reduction information asymmetry and the dominant structure of supply chain participants play crucial roles in shaping product pricing strategies of low-carbon manufacturers and the green promotion efforts of platforms. In practice, while platforms are often responsible for promoting sustainable products to environmentally conscious consumers, the true carbon reduction capabilities of manufacturers are not always transparent. Such asymmetry in information creates strategic uncertainty, which can distort market efficiency and influence the effectiveness of environmental incentives. This paper develops and solves four decision-making models that reflect different combinations of information symmetry and dominance structures: (1)full information with platform dominance, (2)full information with manufacturer dominance, (3)asymmetric information with platform dominance, and (4)asymmetric information with manufacturer dominance. The models utilize a combination of the Stackelberg game theory, where the dominant party acts first, and the signaling game theory to analyze strategic interactions under incomplete information.
The following three key questions are answered by comparing manufacturers’ product pricing and the platform green promotion strategy under different scenarios: (1)How does the information asymmetry of carbon emission reduction affect manufacturers’ optimal product pricing and platform optimal green promotion decisions under different dominant structures? (2)What is the difference in the mechanism of the dominant firm’s first-mover advantage under different carbon reduction information structures? (3)What are the conditions for information sharing between manufacturers and the platform under different dominant structures?
The result shows that: (1)The manufacturer’s product pricing and the platform green promotion decisions under both dominant structures are likely to be deviated from the optimization by the carbon reduction information asymmetry. On the one hand, the first-mover advantage of the dominant platform may disappear due to the information asymmetry, and both the manufacturer and platform may gain higher profits when acting as followers. On the other hand, the effect of dominance on the manufacturer’s private information advantage depends on the emission reduction technology level and market size. (2)For the manufacturer with a high emission reduction technology level dominated by the platform, sharing information with the platform is more beneficial. However, for the dominant manufacturer with a low emission reduction technology level or high emission reduction technology level and low market size, whether to share information with the platform does not affect firm profits.
The insights are: (1)Manufacturers must carefully align their pricing decisions and information disclosure strategies with their actual carbon reduction performance and their relative dominance in the supply chain. For example, a dominant manufacturer with advanced emission reduction technology should consider setting a higher price to prevent imitation by competitors with lower carbon reduction standards. Alternatively, such a firm may benefit from proactively disclosing its emission credentials to the platform, enabling the platform to enhance green promotion efforts and improve consumer trust. (2)Whether the platform incentivizes manufacturers to disclose low-carbon information should be judged based on the type of manufacturers present. When dealing with manufacturers with advanced carbon reduction capabilities, the platform has a strong incentive to encourage transparent disclosure, as such information enhances the effectiveness of green promotion and increases consumer engagement. In contrast, when the manufacturer’s carbon reduction technology is weak or unverifiable, the platform may find little value in promoting information sharing and should instead invest in other verification mechanisms or certification schemes.
While this study provides a foundational understanding of the strategic interactions between platforms and manufacturers under different information and dominance settings, it is limited to the agency model of platform-manufacturer cooperation. In the agency model, the manufacturer sells products directly to consumers through the platform, and the platform earns a commission. However, an important direction for future research lies in extending this framework to the resale model, in which the platform purchases products from the manufacturer and then sells them to end consumers.

Key words: asymmetry information, dominant structure, carbon emissions reduction, signal game, equilibrium strategies