关键词: 失望规避, 权力结构, 供应链管理, 低碳减排, 技术创新有效性

Abstract: This article examines a low-carbon supply chain composed of a disappointment-averse manufacturer and a completely rational retailer. Considering the uncertainty of low-carbon technology innovation investment, this article constructs game models under three channel power structures-manufacturer-led(MS), retailer-led(RS), and the manufacturer and the retailer have equal power(Nash), and addresses decision-making issues such as the optimal emission reduction level and pricing of the low-carbon supply chain. We then analyze and compare the influence of the manufacturer's disappointment aversion coefficient on its optimal emission reduction level and utility under these three power structures. The results show that the manufacturer's disappointment aversion coefficient is negatively correlated with the manufacturer's emission reduction level and utility under all three conditions. When the manufacturer is the leader, the manufacturer has the greatest utility but the lowest emission reduction level. The relationship between the emission reduction level (or the manufacturer's utility) under cases of retailer-led and the manufacturer and the retailer have equal power as a threshold effect of the emission reduction cost coefficient and disappointment aversion level. In addition, through numerical analyses, we find that the retailer's expected profit is the highest when the retailer dominates, second when the powers of the two parties are equal, and the lowest when the manufacturer dominates. At the same time, the total expected profit of the entire supply chain is the lowest when the manufacturer dominates. In the other two power structures, there is also a threshold effect of the emission reduction cost coefficient and the disappointment aversion level.

Key words: disappointment aversion, power structure, supply chain management, low carbon emission reduction, effectiveness of technological innovation