关键词: 供应链管理, 期望损失厌恶, 期权契约, 供应链协调

Abstract: Based on a two-level supply chain composed of a loss averse retailer and a loss neutral supplier, the optimal purchase strategy of the retailer under an option contract is studied by using the expectation-based loss-aversiontheory, which proves that the theory can effectively overcome the disadvantages caused by the exogenous and fixed assumption of the reference point in the traditional research based on the prospect theory. On this basis, the conditions for the supplierand the retailer to achieve a win-win coordination under the option contract are further given. The effects of the retailer’s loss aversion, the price of the option contract and other parameterson the win-win coordination mechanism are analyzed. The results show that the retailer’s loss aversion does not change the role of the royalty in the distribution of the overall supply chain profits, but it can enhance the retailer’s ability of sharing profits, and change the sensitivity of the profits and utility of both sides to the royalty, retail price and production cost. Moreover, the higher loss aversion preference can hinder the realization of cooperation goals between the supplier and the retailer.

Key words: supply chain management, expectation-based loss-aversion, option contracts, supply chain coordination