关键词: 工业遗留污染场地治理, 机会主义行为, 声誉机制, 信号博弈, 防范策略

Abstract: In recent years, with the continuous advancement of industrialization and urbanization in China, a large number of industrial enterprises have been relocated and transferred due to industrial transfer, industrial structure adjustment and upgrading etc. Thus, many industrial contaminated sites require timely remediation and restoration to reduce environmental and social risks. However, as the subject of liability, industrial enterprises have been involved in many problems in the process of their legacy contaminated sites remediation, especially a problem with the industrial enterprises' opportunistic behavior which cannot be totally forbidden. Then, the governance of industrial enterprises' opportunistic behavior has attracted great attention from government departments and researchers. Meanwhile, insufficient government regulation and information asymmetry have been the main causes of opportunism, making it difficult to ensure the effectiveness of legacy contaminated sites remediation and the efficiency of government governance. As such, it is urgent to design a scientific and effective mechanism to prevent industrial enterprises' opportunistic behavior.
Therefore, considering the magnetic field effect of corporate reputation transmission in the new media and big data information era, and the communication effect of public participation in environmental governance, this paper constructs a signal game model for chemical legacy contaminated sites remediation under public attention. Then the reputation mechanism is adopted to explore the variations in industrial enterprises' pollution control and public supervision. The effective conditions of reputation mechanism and the prevention strategies for opportunistic behavior are also discussed.
The research shows that there are three main factors which influence the equilibrium strategy in the process of game between the public and industrial enterprises. First, pollution control bonus given by the local government and information disclosure cost of the enterprises are the key foundations to distinguish different types of pollution control efforts from industrial enterprises. Second, the reputation mechanism could not only identify the camouflage effect of industrial enterprises but also enable the public to maintain relatively low supervision costs and signal verification costs, effectively promoting the enthusiasm of industrial enterprises in pollution control. Third, a certain degree of government discipline and public supervision could significantly improve the reputation restraint effect. According to these conclusions, some suggestions are put forward to prevent the industrial enterprises' opportunistic behavior. First, the local government can set a reasonable range of pollution control bonus and strengthen corresponding punishment mechanism. Second, the public can adjust the information disclosure cost of industrial enterprises by increasing the frequency of supervision. Besides, a blacklist and whitelist system for industrial relocation enterprises should be established to expand the impact of reputation effect. Finally, multiple measures should be taken to enhance the enthusiasm and recognition of public attention and supervision.
The article has enriched the research perspective of the impact of reputation effect on the motivation for industrial enterprises' opportunistic behavior and the strategy of public supervision, but there are also some limitations. For example, this study simplifies the types of pollution control from industrial enterprises and the types of signals, without an in-depth analysis of more types of game players involved in pollution control. In addition, a further exploration of how the relationship between the qualities of information disclosure affecting the model equilibrium solution is also required to taken.

Key words: industrial legacy contaminated sites remediation, opportunistic behavior, reputation mechanism, signaling game, precaution strategies