关键词: 在线零售商竞争, 电商平台, 平台渠道, 信誉认证

Abstract: In recent years, hybrid e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and eBay in the United States, Flipkart in India, JD.com and Suning in China have grown strongly, and the role of marketplace channels has become increasingly prominent. According to Amazon’s financial report for the fourth quarter of 2022, the sales share of sellers in marketplace channels accounted for 59% of total sales. However, there are also a series of problems in the rapid development of marketplace channels, for example, due to the fact that the ownership of products in marketplace channels belongs to online retailers, and the supervision of e-commerce platforms is limited, problems such as delayed delivery, and poor logistics service are common among online retailers in marketplace channels. If these problems continue to trouble consumers, the further development of e-commerce platforms will be seriously restricted.
In response to the above phenomena, some e-commerce platforms (such as JD.com, Suning, etc.) have launched a good store reputation certification for online retailers in the marketplace channels. Specifically, the e-commerce platform evaluates the credibility of online retailers in the marketplace channel through a number of indicators (opening time, store status and integrity, etc.), and adds additional “good store” marks to online retailers that meet the certification standard. According to the signal transmission theory, the reputation certification strategy can transmit signals of products’ quality and service in the store to consumers, and help consumers select high-quality products and services. After the e-commerce platform launches the reputation certification, some online retailers actively improve their store operations according to the certification standards, but there are also some online retailers that maintain the status quo. Therefore, this paper intends to discuss the following questions: (1)If the e-commerce platform launches reputation certification, it is conducive to obtaining higher commission fees from online retailers, but may reduce the revenue of self-operated products, so should the e-commerce platform launch reputation certification for online retailers? (2)When the e-commerce platform launches reputation certification, the completion of reputation certification by online retailers is conducive to increasing revenue, but it needs to pay a certain cost. How should competitive online retailers make decisions? (3)Can reputation certification enable all participants in the online sales system to achieve a win-win situation? If so, what conditions need to be met?
In order to answer the above questions, this paper constructs an online sales system composed of a hybrid e-commerce platform and two competing online retailers. According to the reputation certification strategies of the e-commerce platform and two online retailers, the following three scenarios may occur: the e-commerce platform does not launch reputation certification (scenario NN), the e-commerce platform launches reputation certification but only one online retailer completes the reputation certification (scenario CN or NC), and the e-commerce platform launches reputation certification and both competing online retailers complete the reputation certification (scenario CC). By using the game theory method to solve the optimal solution of the three scenarios and further comparative analysis, the main conclusions of this paper can be obtained: only when the commission rate and consumers’ acceptance of the marketplace channel are high, the e-commerce platform will launch a reputation certification. In the scenario where the e-commerce platform launches a reputation certification, when the cost of reputation certification is low, both of the two online retailers complete the reputation certification; when the cost of reputation certification is in the medium range, only one online retailer will complete the reputation certification. In addition, an increase in consumers’ acceptance for uncertified products and commission rate helps competitive online retailers achieve differentiated reputation certification, while an increase in consumers’ acceptance of the marketplace channel helps competitive online retailers complete reputation certification at the same time. The conclusion of this paper can provide decision-making reference for the reputation certification of e-commerce platforms and the strategy formulation of online retailer service investment.

Key words: online retailer competition, e-commerce platform, marketplace channel, reputation certification