关键词: 云资源提供商, 合作博弈, 收益分配, 核心, Shapley值

Abstract: Cloud computing is a hot research topic at present in information sciences and management sciences, where cloud providers are a basic element in cloud federation platform. A mechanism design of suitable revenue allocation among cloud providers is a key factor which can improve operational capability of the cloud federation. In this paper, we set up a cooperative game model for multiple cloud providers, and show that the cooperative game is sup-additive and possess a non-empty core. We study a suitable revenue allocation by means of the core and the Shapley value. We use some numerical examples to indicate that the characteristic function is not convex, and to show how to compute the core and the Shapley value. Based on this, we give a revenue allocation mechanism among the multiple cloud providers. The results of this paper provide new highlights for understanding cooperative behavior of multiple cloud providers under the IaaS.

Key words: cloud provider, cooperative game, revenue allocation, core, Shapley value