关键词: 分销渠道, 强势零售商, 博弈论, 协商机制, 内生时机

Abstract: In the non-asymmetric competing channels with a dominant retailer, this paper analyzes the effects of negotiation mechanism, market competition and bargaining power of dominant retailer on equilibrium results under three game timing, and then explores endogenous timing of competing channels. Finally, the basic model is extended from two angels of sale cost and store traffic. The study shows that the negotiation mechanism improves market demand and profits of dominant retail channel. When the market has more intense competition, the manufacturer will get the benefit of the fisherman from retailer competition, and dominant retailer will suffer from strongly depressing product wholesale price. In the past studies, the game timing hypothesis of simultaneous leadership of retailers has some flaws, and the sequential leadership is endogenous timing of competing channels. Differential sale cost and store traffic will narrow the double-equilibrium region of endogenous timing.

Key words: distribution channels, dominant retailer, game theory, negotiation mechanism, endogenous timing