技术许可下信息分享和政府补贴对闭环供应链的影响分析——基于经销商再制造模式

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0057

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了信息分享对制造商许可经销商从事再制造模式下闭环供应链的影响。分别建立了无信息分享和信息分享下经销商再制造和制造商再制造两种模式下的闭环供应链模型并分析了政府补贴对废旧产品回收量和渠道成员决策的影响。研究发现,当经销商对制造商进行信息分享时,经销商的利润减少,而制造商的利润增加。渠道领导者制造商总是能从再制造活动中抽取利润,在经销商再制造模式下,制造商通过收取许可费分享再制造的利润;在制造商再制造模式下,制造商设定适当的批发价格及回收价格协调正向流和逆向流,从而实现利润最大化。同时表明了政府补贴的刺激会显著地提高废旧产品的回收量。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 经销商再制造, 技术许可, 信息分享, 政府补贴

Abstract: The economic and environmental benefits of remanufacturing have attracted considerable attention in literature and practice. This paper analyzes a closed-loop supply chain where the manufacturer licenses the distributor to remanufacture and the distributor decides whether to share his private demand information with the manufacturer. Moreover, we investigate the impact of information sharing on distributor-remanufacturing and manufacturer-remanufacturing modes, and examine how government subsidy affects collection quantity of used products and chain members’profits. We show that, when the distributor shares information with the manufacturer, the distributor’s profit decreases while the manufacturers profit increases. In the distributor-remanufacturing mode, the manufacturer would share the remanufacturing profits by charging a licensing fee from the distributor. While in the manufacturer-remanufacturing mode, the manufacturer would set an appropriate wholesale price and acquisition price to coordinate the forward and reverseflows, and eventually maximize his own profit. We also show that, the government subsidy results in a positive effect on collection quantity of used products, the licensing fee and chain members’profits. Specifically, when the unit subsidy is large enough, the manufacturer would choose the manufacturer-remanufacturing mode as he can directly obtain government subsidy by collecting and remanufacturing used products. When the unit subsidy is relatively small, the manufacturer prefers the distributor-remanufacturing rather than manufacturer-remanufacturing mode. These results can provide new insights on distributor-remanufacturing mode in a closed-loop supply chain in the presence of information sharing and government subsidy.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, distributor-remanufacturing, technology licensing, information sharing, government subsidy

中图分类号:

F270

黄燕婷, 王宗军. 技术许可下信息分享和政府补贴对闭环供应链的影响分析——基于经销商再制造模式[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(3): 57-66.

HUANG Yan-ting, WANG Zong-jun. The Effect of Information Sharing and Government Subsidy ina Closed-loop Supply Chain with Technology Licensing——Based on Distributor Remanufacturing[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(3): 57-66.

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