关键词: 垃圾分类, 演化博弈, 积分机制

Abstract: The existing studies show that garbage classification is an important way to alleviate environmental issues. However, the current incentive mechanisms for garbage classification exist some problems, such as heavy burden on residents, great resistance to policy promotion, and so on. This paper proposes a new incentive mechanism which combines the green credits of garbage classification with the traditional carbon market. The evolutionary game theory is applied to develop a tripartite non-cooperative game model among the government, enterprises and residents. Finally, the sensitivity analysis is carried out on how the key parameters affect their decisions through numerical simulation. The results show that: (1)the final balance state is: the government will choose the credit mechanism, the enterprises choose the radical production, and the residents choose to carry out garbage classification; (2)based on the numerical simulation, it is concluded that: i)under the credit mechanism, the government can accelerate the evolution process by increasing propaganda and regulatory costs within 10% or enterprise subsidies within 40%; ii)when the credit income reduced by less than 30%, or the time and physical expenditure increased by less than 15%, the garbage classification is still optimal; iii)if the production income reduced by less than 10% or the credit price increased by less than 75%, the radical production decision is still optimal. Therefore, the credit mechanism proposed in this study is more efficient than the current incentive mechanisms.

Key words: garbage classification, evolutionary game, credit mechanism